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NEOCLASSICAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski*
This Article introduces an approach to administrative law that reconciles a more formalist,
classical understanding of law and its supremacy with the contemporary administrative
state. Courts adopting this approach, which I call "neoclassical administrative law," are
skeptical of judicial deference on questions of law, tend to give more leeway to agencies
on questions of policy, and attend more closely to statutes governing administrative
procedure than contemporary doctrine does. As a result, neoclassical administrative law
finds a place for both legislative supremacy and the rule of law within the administrative
state, without subordinating either of those central values to the other. Such an approach
reconciles traditional notions of the judicial role and separation of powers within the
administrative state that Congress has chosen to construct and provides a clearer, more
appealing allocation of responsibilities between courts and agencies. This theory is
"classical" in its defense of the autonomy of law and legal reasoning, separation of powers,
and the supremacy of law. These commitments distinguish it from theorists that would
have courts make a substantial retreat in administrative law. It is "new" in that, unlike
other more classical critiques of contemporary administrative law, it seeks to integrate
those more formalist commitments with the administrative state we have today - and
will have for the foreseeable future.

INTRODUCTION

It is never easy to theorize complex bodies of law, but the current
state of administrative legal theory is particularly hard to capture. 1 Earlier eras strike us, in retrospect, as susceptible to easy periodization. We
can speak of the time from the nation's founding to the dramatic growth
of the administrative state, a period characterized by separation of powers formalism supervised by courts, as well as a limited role for federal
agencies. This was followed by the Progressive and New Deal eras,
which rejected both of those features in favor of expert agencies applying - and, later, having the primary task of formulating - wide-ranging
federal policy while courts got out of the way. Then we can speak of
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful for comments and questions from
Roger Alford, Nick Bagley, Kent Barnett, Tricia Bellia, Evan Bernick, Sam Bray, Emily Bremer,
Christian Burset, Bill Buzbee, Katherine Crocker, Barry Cushman, Nicole Garnett, Rick Garnett,
Michael Herz, Kristin Hickman, Bruce Huber, Randy Kozel, Anita Krishnakumar, Ron Levin, John
Manning, Jenn Mascott, Mark McKenna, Nina Mendelson, Aaron Nielson, Paul Noe, Jennifer N ou,
Allison Orr Larsen, Nicholas Parrillo, Eloise Pasachoff, Zach Price, Connor Raso, Dan Rodriguez,
Peter Shane, Glen Staszewski, Lee Strang, Peter Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule, Chris
Walker, Adam White, and the participants at faculty workshops at Harvard Law School, Notre
Dame Law School, and St. John's University Law School. I am grateful for the opportunity to
develop this paper with the help of conferences organized and hosted by the Center for the Study
of the Administrative State and the University of Michigan Law School. Meredith Holland provided excellent research assistance. I'm especially grateful to Sarah Pojanowski.
1 I expressed similar views on the current state of administrative law in my introduction to a
recent symposium on administrative law hosted by the Notre Dame Law Review. See Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Introduction: Administrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1415 (2018).
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the capture era,2 in which courts reengaged to ensure agencies pursued
the interest of the public, not regulated industries. Each characterization is of course subject to qualification, but even such rough cuts suggest a distinctive cast of mind for each era in administrative thought.
Things have not been so clear ever since. Perhaps starting with the
Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee,3 administrative legal
thought has been marked by an absence of any dominant tendency.
More than anything, the current state of administrative law reflects a
pragmatic compromise: carefully calibrated judicial deference on questions of law matched by similarly modulated freedom for agencies on
questions of politics and policy. Respect for the limits of judicial capacity interweaves with concerns about agency slack or fecklessness, leading to a doctrinal fabric that is either nuanced or incoherent, depending
on one's priors. Yet, for much of this time, it would have been wrong
to say that administrative law was in a state of theoretical crisis. Aside
from a few marginal voices condemning the entire project, administrative law and scholarship trundled along, disagreeing, for example, about
when Chevron 4 deference should apply or precisely how much a reviewing court should demand from agencies in policymaking decisions. 5
These were important disagreements, to be sure, but they operated
within a shared framework of admittedly unstated, and perhaps conflicting, assumptions about the administrative state and the rule of law.
As with contemporary politics, however, that comfortable, overlapping consensus is showing cracks. Whatever one thinks about the nature and causes of our fractured politics today, the arising dissent from
the administrative law mainstream is principled and intellectually rigorous - and does not always have a neat partisan valence. Although
they share little else in common, Professors Adrian Vermeule and Philip
Hamburger both offer important challenges to the pragmatic balance
that administrative legal doctrine has struck in the past three decades.
Vermeule sees the inner logic of administrative legal doctrine "working
itself pure," such that courts come to recognize the vanity of trying to
do more than ensure agency decisions satisfy thin legal rationality. 6

2 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: I967-I983, 72 CHI.-KENT

L. REV. ro39 (1997) (describing capture theory and its rise in administrative law and scholarship).
3

Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding that in
a category of cases, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency"); see also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 2 28-31 (2001) (identifying factors that indicate when Chevron deference applies).
5 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1983) (elaborating the scope of review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
6 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION 22 (2016) ("Law has decided that it best serves
its own ends by lying more or less quietly under the throne.").
4
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Hamburger, by contrast, sees contemporary doctrine propping up an
unconstitutional Leviathan. 7 Yet both tug at the two threads mainstream administrative law seeks to hold together in workable tension,
namely (a) the desire for effective and politically responsive administrative governance in a complex world and (b) the aspiration for a robust
yet impersonal rule of law above administrative fiat. 8
Rumblings at the Supreme Court also suggest that the current balance is becoming unstable. Inspired by criticisms along the line of
Hamburger's, a number of Justices have questioned the breadth and
even the validity of Chevron deference to agencies' interpretations of
statutes. 9 Judges on the courts of appeals have followed suit. 10 Following up on a line of criticism voiced in concurring opinions, 11 the Court also

7 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, Is ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 7 (2014) ("Administrative power thus brings back to life three basic elements of absolute power. It is extralegal, supralegal, and consolidated.").
8 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104
NW. U. L. REV. 799, 85 1 (2oro) (arguing that in administrative law, conceptions of "law as discretionary command and law as reasoned resolution ... are prominent and perhaps ineradicable in
discussion of legal reasoning").
9 Three current Justices, in addition to recently retired Justice Kennedy, have raised such questions. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2ro5, 2120-21 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
"reflexive deference" to agencies under Chevron is "troubling" and stating "it seems necessary and
appropriate to reconsider" the doctrine); Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (arguing Chevron is inconsistent with the Constitution and Marbury v. Madison);
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 115 2 (roth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that the abdication of judicial power under Chevron could cause due process and equal protection concerns); Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2u8,
2150 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)) (claiming that
"Chevron [itself] is an atextual invention by courts"). Chief Justice Roberts has not directly challenged Chevron, though he has argued that the courts must be more exacting in ensuring Congress
has delegated agencies interpretive authority. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 318-22
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (identifying cases where the Court has carefully scrutinized
whether Congress has delegated interpretive authority). Justice Alito joined his dissent in City of
Arlington. Id. at 3 1 2.
10 See Waterkeeper AIL v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527,539 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Brown, J., concurring) ("An
Article III renaissance is emerging against the judicial abdication performed in Chevron's name.");
Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) Gordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling for the reconsideration of Chevron); Raymond M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency
Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 32326 (2017) (criticizing Chevron deference); Amul R. Thapar & Benjamin Beaton, The Pragmatism of
Interpretation: A Review of Richard A. Posner, The Federal Judiciary, 116 MICH. L. REV. 819, 822
(2018) (book review) (criticizing "convoluted tiers of deference").
11 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1212-13 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment); id. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 12ro (Alito, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616-21 (2013)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 67-69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). Appellate judges have also questioned Auer deference.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (holding that a reviewing court will uphold an agency's
interpretation unless it is "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation" (quoting Robertson
v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989))); see United States v. Havis, 907 F.3d
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considered in Kisor v. Wilkie, 12 decided last Term, whether to overrule
the longstanding doctrine of judicial deference to agencies' interpretations of their own regulations. 13 Justice Kagan cobbled together a majority to preserve such deference, 14 but only by reformulating the doctrine in a manner that, for most purposes, could render it practically
indistinguishable from the approach recommended by its critics. 15
Coming in the opposite direction are challenges to judicially imposed
constraints on agencies' policymaking processes. The Supreme Court
unanimously repudiated as inconsistent with the Administrative
Procedure Act 16 (APA) a D.C. Circuit doctrine that required agencies to
go through the notice-and-comment process before changing interpretive rules that lack the force of law.17 One of then-Judge Kavanaugh's
most notable opinions on the D.C. Circuit, moreover, criticized that
court's imposition of common law procedural requirements atop the
APA's provisions for agency rulemaking. 18
All told, hornbook doctrine on judicial review is under fire for being
both too timid and too intrusive. With an eye toward such uncertainty,
and taking the opportunity to rethink settled practice, this Article proposes an alternative way forward.
It does not offer a wholesale defense of contemporary doctrine's eclectic balancing of administrative fiat and legal reason, but neither does
it embrace the wholesale rejection of the administrative state or bureaucratic supremacy over law. Rather, it identifies and offers a tentative
defense of an approach that returns to a more formalist, classical understanding of law and its supremacy. This approach accounts for, and
embraces, much of the recent criticism of administrative law doctrine,
while also explaining why those worries need not entail that courts
439, 450 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring) (questioning Auer deference); Egan, 85 1 F.3d at 2 78
Gordan, J., concurring) (calling for the reconsideration of Auer).
12 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
13 See id. at 2408.
14 Id. at 2408.
l5 See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The Court cannot muster even five
votes to say that Auer is lawful or wise. Instead, a majority retains Auer only because of stare
decisis. And yet, far from standing by that precedent, the majority proceeds to impose so many
new and nebulous qualifications and limitations on Auer that the Chief Justice claims to see little
practical difference between keeping it on life support in this way and overruling it entirely. So the
doctrine emerges maimed and enfeebled - in truth, zombified.").
16 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553-559, 701-706 (2018).
17 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206-ro (2015) (abrogating the holding in
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
18 See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). That said, the
Court's scrutiny of agency policymaking often is consistent with more intrusive, "hard look" review.
Compare Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (applying vigorous arbitrary and capricious
review), and Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 52-53(2011) (same), with FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass'n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (applying a lighter touch to arbitrary and capricious review).
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police the details of regulatory policy or single-handedly undo the administrative state Congress has constructed. To make this showing, this
Article pulls together strands of thought emerging in administrative law
and scholarship and expands upon the pattern. 19 I call this alternative
neoclassical administrative law. 20
The neoclassical approach rejects judicial deference on legal questions while respecting the policy choices that agencies legislate in the
discretionary space Congress has given them. In doing so, neoclassical
administrative law finds a place for both legislative supremacy and the
rule of law within the administrative state, without subordinating either
of those central values to the other. Such an approach reconciles traditional notions of the judicial role and separation of powers within the
administrative state that Congress has chosen to construct and provides
a clearer, more appealing allocation of responsibilities between courts
and agencies.
Neoclassical administrative law has a greater faith in the autonomy
and determinacy of legal craft than the working, moderate legal realism
that characterizes much mainstream administrative law. This faith in
the autonomy of law does not, however, translate into a belief that the
law never runs out. Rather, neoclassical administrative law holds that
courts should be less engaged in review of agency policymaking than
current doctrine suggests. Such an approach insists that the line
between law and policy is sharper than administrative law's standard
account, and that courts should be more vigilant in patrolling that
boundary. Overall, this approach is "classical" in its defense of the
autonomy of law and legal reasoning and its commitment to the

l9 See generally, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017) (offering a historical explanation of the development of judicial
deference to executive interpretation); Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont
Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2007) (arguing against judicial imposition of procedural requirements on informal rulemaking); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial
Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998) (criticizing judges who ignore statutory language that "under
any interpretive theory, would be relevant to deciding the issue," id. at 152); Kavanaugh, supra note
9, at 2 150-54 (questioning Chevron deference from formalist premises); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules
About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515 (2018) (arguing
that judicial interference in agency rulemaking conflicts with the text and history of the APA).
zo I have used this term, albeit in a slightly different sense, in a short essay on the early twentiethcentury scholar John Dickinson and his work's relationship to contemporary administrative law.
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, NEW RAMBLER (Sept. 26,
2016), https://newramblerreview.com/book-reviews/law/neoclassical-administrative-common-law
[https://perma.cc/QWP9-ZP3 7]. The movement I describe here is different than the approach
Professor Keith Werhan criticized in The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 567 (1992). Werhan's account unites Chevron deference with a retreat of judicial common
lawmaking in procedural and policymaking review, emphasizing a decline of faith in legal determinacy as part of 1980s administrative law. Id. at 594. In my account, Chevron is suspect and the
positive law governing judicial review comes front and center because of increased faith in legal
craft. Both approaches, however, embrace the line between law and policy, id. at 590, though this
Article is more sympathetic to that development than Werhan 's, which defends an approach along
the lines of administrative pragmatism discussed below.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

separation of powers and supremacy of law. These commitments distinguish it from approaches to administrative law that would have reviewing courts beat a retreat to the margins. It is "new" in that, unlike
other more classical, critical approaches of contemporary administrative
law, it seeks to integrate those more formal commitments with the administrative state we have - and will have for the foreseeable future.
Importantly, and relatedly, neoclassical administrative law holds that
courts should be more attentive and faithful to the positive law governing the administrative state, especially the APA. In particular, it contends that closer attention to the APA may provide more determinate
and legitimate answers to questions of judicial review than does the
current doctrine's working pragmatism. This neoclassical approach is
not inherently skeptical of administrative common law. In fact, a neoclassicist reading of the APA can turn on lawyerly investigation of the
common law of judicial review that Congress originally incorporated
within the statute. It is a recognition of the hierarchy of statutory law
over judicial doctrine, not skepticism about legal craft, that presses toward closer attention to the APA. This reading of the APA, moreover,
coalesces with the neoclassicist's broader jurisprudential commitments
to the division of labor between courts and agencies in the realms of law
and policy, respectively.
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I situate neoclassical administrative law by outlining three established, competing frameworks
for administrative law. In doing so, I focus on those frameworks' approaches to judicial review of questions of law and policy. Second, I
introduce neoclassical administrative law. There I take a first pass at
identifying its legal commitments and then explain how they play out
along the same dimensions as the established frameworks. This is in
part a work of reconstruction and speculation, because I do not yet see
a critical mass of thinkers marching under this banner with a uniform
program on the questions at issue. Third, I address the questions and
challenges neoclassical administrative law faces, a task that will further
illuminate its jurisprudential commitments.

I. THREE LEADING FRAMEWORKS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
At the cost of oversimplifying, we can sketch three prominent frameworks for thinking about administrative law and the legitimacy and
shape of the administrative state today. These three sketches are ideal
types, and even thinkers I flag as representative may not agree with all
the doctrinal particulars under any one heading. This section will explore
the frameworks' competing approaches to judicial review of questions
of substantive law, procedure, and policy. Identifying these competing
approaches to this triumvirate of questions will help situate the fourth,
neoclassical alternative that has been emerging in recent years.
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A quick note on scope: The discussion below focuses on judicial review of agency actions. For the most part it does not address, at least
directly, the constitutionality of the governing structures Congress has
chosen in building the administrative state. This latter category includes
appointment and removal of officers, determination of who counts as an
officer of the United States, the vesting of adjudicative powers in nonArticle III courts, and the breadth of delegation to agencies. These are
important questions and it is sometimes impossible to cordon them off
entirely; nondelegation concerns, for example, can come into play when
reviewing agencies' decisions on administrative policymaking. But
these concerns are not directly relevant for all the perspectives I discuss
below, and, more importantly, I would like to focus on the operation of
judicial review of agency decisions once the mechanisms are in place.
In short, this discussion focuses on ordinary administrative law rather
than questions of constitutional law directly.

A. Jurisprudential Context
Before identifying the competing approaches to judicial review of
administrative action, it is first useful to situate these stances in terms
of a broader jurisprudential context. A useful lens through which to
view these rival approaches to American administrative law comes
from, of all places, turn-of-the-twentieth-century British constitutional
scholar Albert Venn Dicey. Dicey's Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution was a seminal text for Commonwealth public
lawyers and famously, or infamously, contrasted the rule of law in the
common law tradition with what he saw as the despotism of Continental
public law, exemplified by the French droit administratif 21 Dicey's
shadow extended to debates about administrative law in the United
States. Leading "legalist" critics of the expanding administrative state
in the first half of the twentieth century drew on Diceyan ideas to argue
that common law courts were necessary to secure liberty and protect
against arbitrary agency action. 22

21 See A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
213 (Liberty Fund 1982) (1885) (arguing that the "scheme of administrative law - known to
Frenchmen as droit administratif - ... rests on ideas foreign to the fundamental assumptions of
our English common law"). Subsequent scholars have since criticized Dicey 's interpretation of
French law. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 226 (1992).
22 See HORWITZ, supra note 21, at 225-28 (explicating the Diceyan character of the "legalist"
argument against the administrative state, particularly in the work of Professor Roscoe Pound);
Daniel R. Ernst, Dicey's Disciple on the D.C. Circuit: Judge Harold Stephens and Administrative
Law Reform, I933-I940, 90 GEO. L.J. 787, 787-89 (2002) ("As did the eminent Oxford law professor
Albert Venn Dicey, [opponent of specialized administrative tribunals] Stephens believed that freedom required that the actions of state officials be subject to effective review by 'the ordinary Courts
of the land."' Id. at 788-89 (quoting DICEY, supra note 21, at IIO)).
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Early modern debates about the rise and shape of the American administrative state offered a choice between a court-centric Diceyan vision and a progressive alternative that relied on the energy and expertise
of agency policymakers. This argument is not of merely historical interest, however, and viewing Diceyan ideas only in terms of opposition
to administrative governance obscures their enduring legacy. As insightful scholars have recently emphasized, arguments today about judicial
review of agency action are attempts to reconcile, or overcome, the
"Diceyan dialectic" between legislative supremacy and the rule of law
after the rise of the administrative state. 23
Professor Matthew Lewans has argued that Diceyan constitutional
theory - which identifies (a) legislative supremacy and (b) the rule of
law as its two foundational principles - excludes legitimate administrative authority "by stipulation." 24 Under the Diceyan framework, ultimate legal authority flows from a supreme legislature 25 whose dictates
courts authoritatively interpret, thereby preserving the rule of law. 26 In
this classical understanding, an administrative agency is not the legislature, whether we define it as Congress in the United States or Queenin-Parliament in the United Kingdom. Nor are administrative agencies
"'ordinary' courts" charged with ensuring actions of legal officials are
subordinate to law; rather, they consist of the very officials who must be
subordinate to the rule of law. 27
As neither ultimate lawmakers nor duly constituted courts, administrative agencies are the excluded middle under the logic of traditional,
Diceyan constitutionalism. 28 Yet there they are. What to do about this,
we shall see, is a persistent question underlying arguments today about
the legitimacy of administrative governance and the relationship between courts and agencies.

23 See MATTHEW LEWANS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 14-41
(2016) (exploring and "rethinking" the role of the "Diceyan dialectic" in administrative law) [hereinafter LEWANS, ALJD]; Kevin M. Stack, Overcoming Dicey in Administrative Law, 68 U.
TORONTO L.J. 293, 297 (2018) ("Diceyian premises still anchor administrative law in the United
Kingdom (UK) in important respects and have been a recurring source of appeal, critique, and
argument in the United States and Canada.").
24 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 15.
2 5 In jurisdictions with entrenched, written constitutions like the United States, the legislature
is not supreme, but we can readily adapt these jurisdictions to the Diceyan framework by identifying the constitution as ultimate positive law enacted by supreme lawmakers - the people who
adopted it.
26 See LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 14-15.
27 Id. at 20.
28 Id. ("Dicey's conception of the rule of law ... by definition ... excludes the possibility that
administrative institutions might wield legal authority under the constitution.").
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B. Administrative Supremacy
Administrative supremacy sees the administrative state as a natural,
salutary outgrowth of modern governance. In its strongest form, it sees
the role of courts and lawyers as limited to checking patently unreasonable exercises of power by the administrative actors who are the core of
modern governance. To the extent that durable, legal norms are relevant, the primary responsibility for implementing them in administrative governance falls to executive officials, who balance those norms'
worth against other policy goals. Today, the work of Vermeule demonstrates this approach in almost platonic form. 29
A slightly more interventionist strain recognizes the importance, indeed the constitutional necessity, of the administrative state, but concludes that courts can have a larger role in ensuring the legitimate and
effective operation of those engines of governance. The courts do not
operate primarily under the appellate model of reviewing the substance
of the policymaking choices or ensuring the agency has chosen the best
legal interpretation of the statute it administers. Rather, judicial interventions should provide incentives for effective governance or manage
salutary checks and balances within the administrative state. Such an
approach, exemplified by contemporary scholars like Professors Gillian
Metzger 30 and Jon Michaels, 31 has antecedents in thinkers like James
Landis. 32
What these approaches share is an unapologetic embrace of the
administrative state and a confident rejection of challenges to its legitimacy. This framework, whether grounded in consequentialist or constitutional considerations, informs the pro-administrativist approach to judicial review. 33 This section explores such an approach to judicial
review of questions of legal substance, procedure, and policymaking.
r. Review of Legal Interpretations - Substance. - Administrative
supremacy in its purest form advocates deference across the board to
agency interpretations of statutes and regulations. Regarding statutes,

29 See generally VERMEULE, supra note 6 (arguing that the judiciary voluntarily ceded its
power to the administrative state).
30 See Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 20I6 Term - Foreword: I93os Redux: The
Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77-95 (2017) (outlining the administrative
state's functions and obligatoriness).
31 See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION'S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 179-201 (2017) (explaining how judicial review should "nudge[] and, if necessary, compel[] the coordinate branches to foster a well-functioning administrative separation of
powers," id. at 179).
32 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938) (championing the necessity
of administrative governance); id. at 46 (explaining that independent "administrative power" should
counterbalance a powerful executive).
33 Cf Metzger, supra note 30, at 4 (coining the term "anti-administrativism" to characterize the
recent wave of critique of the administrative state's legitimacy).
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the supremacist prescribes a "Step Zero" 34 similar to Justice Scalia's dissent in United States v. Mead Corp. 35 : if the interpretation under review
is the agency's "authoritative interpretation" of the statute it administers, the Chevron doctrine should apply irrespective of the form in which
it was proffered. 36 Once Chevron applies, the reviewing court's scrutiny
will not be searching. Unlike, say, Justice Scalia's rigorous, textualist
Step One, 37 the administrative supremacist will find the agency's interpretation reasonable if it is colorable under any well-accepted interpretive methodology, even if it is not the reviewing court's preferred
method. 38 Similarly, a reviewing court should not scour the statutory
scheme or deploy an array of canons to render an apparently unclear
statutory provision more precise - a first, rough impression that the
statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation should suffice. 39
The administrative supremacist takes a similar tack on agencies'
interpretations of their own regulations. Whatever the original understanding or justifications of Seminole Rock/Auer4° deference, the doctrine is correct today for the same reasons that justify Chevron deference: the resolution of legal uncertainty requires technical and political
choices that agencies, rather than courts, should make. 41 Practical

34 Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188, 190-91 (2006) (identifying as
"Step Zero" the threshold question of whether Chevron deference applies).
35 533 U.S. 2 r8 (2001).
36 Id. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 5 r r, 52 r (noting that he "finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists").
38 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, ror MICH. L. REV.
885, 931 (2003) (suggesting that Chevron may allow agencies to adopt purposivist interpretations
even if courts would adopt textualist ones); see also Metzger, supra note 30, at 40 (contending that
the attack on deference "conflicts with broadly accepted legal realist insights about the frequency
of legal indeterminacy, and thus of policymaking, in judicial decisionmaking").
39 See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
opinion today requires more than ro pages, including a review of numerous statutory provisions
and legislative history, to conclude that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA or Act) is clear
and unambiguous on the question whether it applies to agency directives to private parties to collect
specified information and disseminate or make it available to third parties."); ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 4 (2006) (arguing that judges' institutional limitations suggest
they should engage in clause-bound, even "wooden" approaches to statutory interpretation).
40 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 4ro
(1945); cf Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing the Lost History of Seminole Rock,
65 EMORY L.J. 47, 52 (2015) (using historical analysis to show "that the confidence with which
courts reflexively apply Seminole Rock deference ... is misplaced"); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, r6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 88 (2018) [hereinafter Pojanowski, Seminole
Rock] ("The doubts about Auer doctrine in its current form ... flow from [the] generalization and
extension of Seminole Rock beyond the interpretive framework in which it was originally at home.").
41 See Metzger, supra note 30, at 94 (arguing that when Congress has delegated interpretive
authority, "a necessary consequence of acknowledging Congress's power to delegate is that courts
should defer to agencies' exercise of their delegated authority"); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
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worries about agency gamesmanship are unproven 42 and, largely, beside
the point: if an agency seeks to use Auer to get around Mead's restriction
on Chevron deference, the agency is doing the good work of ameliorating
the misguided 43 limits the Court has imposed at Step Zero. Constitutional objections about separation of powers and self-delegation, moreover, are unavailing on their own terms and misplaced, since Auer
merely affects the timing of the exercise of agency power, not its ultimate
allocation.
This is not to say a champion of the administrative state would never
counsel against deference on unclear questions of statutory interpretation. If Congress clearly did not want the court to defer, presumably
legislative supremacy would require courts to respect that choice. 44
Michaels, a champion of the administrative state's legitimacy and necessity,45 moreover, would calibrate deference doctrines to give agencies
incentives to ensure participation of civil servants and public commenters in the policymaking process. 46
2. Review of Legal Interpretations Procedure. - In a similar vein,
the administrative supremacist would give agencies wide leeway in
choosing how to make law and policy. Whether the agency followed
proper policymaking procedures is in one respect a legal question: the
reviewing court is asking whether the agency correctly interpreted, say,
Supreme Court due process jurisprudence, the APA, its organic statute,
or its own procedural regulations. I have broken this category out from
interpretations of substantive law for three reasons.
First, some courts and commentators treat procedural provisions differently for deference purposes. 47 Second, the complexity introduced by

Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 306--07 (2017) (defending
Auer on Chevron-like terms).
42 See Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation False Alarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's Effect on
Agency Rules, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 92 (2019) (finding that "agencies did not measurably increase the vagueness of their rules in response to Auer").
43 See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005) ("Years have passed since Mead was decided, and we
still lack a clear answer to the question when an agency is entitled to Chevron deference for procedures other than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication."); Adrian Vermeule,
Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 349 (2003) ("In the trenches of
the D.C. Circuit ... Mead's ambitious recasting of deference law has gone badly awry, for reasons
that expose deficiencies in the decision itself.").
44 See Metzger, supra note 30, at 93-94 (acknowledging that deference rests on identifying a
delegation).
45 See MICHAELS, supra note 31, at 55-57 (criticizing apologetic defenses of the administrative
state that mistakenly concede its constitutional legitimacy as dubious).
46 Id. at 181-83 (proposing doctrines that encourage agencies to respect a separation of administrative powers).
4 7 See, e.g., Melissa M. Berry, Beyond Chevron's Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 541, 545 (2007) ("[A]gency interpretations of their
enabling statutes' procedural provisions should lie beyond 'Chevron's domain."' (quoting Thomas
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overlapping sources of procedural law makes these kinds of legal questions feel different from your standard Chevron or Auer problem - we
carve off issues like Chenery Il 48 questions into a different conceptual
space even if, at some level, we are asking whether the agency's choice
to proceed by adjudication was lawful. Finally, procedural questions
have a duck-rabbit character with respect to review of legal interpretations and review of agency policymaking. Arguments about failure to
provide a "reasoned explanation" on the policy merits merge into claims
that the agency failed to satisfy the APA's procedural requirement of a
statement of basis and purpose (as liberally construed by appellate
courts). 49
Administrative supremacy here focuses on canonical cases giving
agencies substantial deference in choosing what procedure the law requires; put another way, it is hesitant to say the law constrains much at
all. Chenery II rejected the notion that the APA provides (or that courts
should craft) any substantial legal limits on the choice to proceed
through rulemaking or adjudication. 50 Also taking pride of place is
Vermont Yankee's rejection of the D.C. Circuit's attempt to overlay a
common law of procedural obligations atop the APA requirements for
the comment phase of informal rulemaking. 51 Similarly, Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n 52 rejected the D.C. Circuit doctrine that required agencies to undertake notice-and-comment rulemaking before
amending interpretive rules. 53 Less frequently mentioned, but in the
same vein, is United States v. Florida East Coast Railway Co. 's54 dispatching of agency obligations to engage in formal rulemaking, 55 as well
as cases invoking Chevron to give agencies wide latitude in their choice
to proceed through informal or formal adjudication. 56

W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001))); cf William S.
Jordan, III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249,
282-320 (2009) (arguing that Chevron deference should not apply to an agency's determination of
whether a statutory hearing requirement triggers the APA's formal adjudication procedures).
48 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202--03 (1947) (granting agencies wide discretion to
choose between rulemaking and adjudication in implementing their statutory mandates).
49 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S.502,515 (2009); see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 752-53 (6th ed. 2013) ("Modern procedural requirements are ... driven
largely by concerns about substantive review." Id. at 753.).
5o Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03.
51 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543-45 (1978).
52 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
53 Id. at 1206.
54 4ro U.S. 224 (1973).
55 Id. at 241-42 (holding that opportunity to present written submissions satisfies statutory criteria for a "hearing").
56 See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
under Chevron, "a statutory reference to a 'hearing"' does not necessarily "evince[] an intention to
require formal adjudicatory procedures"). The D.C. Circuit's position is the majority one. See, e.g.,
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Drawing on this canon, administrative supremacy targets doctrines
that limit agencies' interpretations of their own procedural obligations.
At the top of the list are judicially imposed requirements for the notice
stage of rulemaking, as well as judicial expansion of the requirement
that an agency issue merely a brief statement of basis and purpose in
defense of its rules. Indeed, some have even questioned the legal basis
for the doctrine that agencies must adhere to their own regulations, including procedural rules, until they are amended. 57
In these instances, the administrative supremacist is either saying
that (a) the positive administrative law we have clearly does not significantly limit administrative discretion, or (b) if there is play in the legal
joints, courts ought to stay their hands, or both. The first line of argument echoes Vermont Yankee's emphasis that the APA is a compromise
that hammers in place both a floor and a ceiling, at least from the perspective of judicial intervention. 58 The second line of argument, premised on the legal indeterminacy of the procedural materials, insists that
judicial intervention in this realm is just as inappropriate as it is with
substantive law. The tradeoffs inherent in deciding how many resources
to spend on process in pursuit of a policy are no less value-laden than
picking the proper point in the "policy space" created by ambiguity in
substantive law. 59
3. Review of Agency Policymaking. - Administrative supremacy in
its purest form presses against the "hard look" doctrine originating in
the D.C. Circuit and blessed by the Supreme Court in State Farm. 60 As
a normative matter, administrative supremacy claims that rigorous judicial scrutiny is unwise and illegitimate. Courts have neither the technical expertise nor the political accountability to check the agencies'
Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting prior
presumption in favor of formal adjudication in light of Chevron).
57 See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1924, 1958 (2018) ("The problem is that while neither [Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Co., 284 U.S. 370 (1932),] nor [United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260 (1954),] could be taken ... to reflect the perceived morality of administrative law,
neither decision offers a clear justification for the principle they announce. What source of law is
involved?"); see also id. at 1960 (arguing that the attempt to ground Arizona Grocery/Accardi in the
APA "may sound plausible, but it is not clearly convincing").
5 8 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978).
59 Some vocal defenders of the administrative state are more agnostic along these lines. Metzger,
for example, has defended the legitimacy of the courts' power to craft judicial common law that
imposes additional procedural requirements, but recognizes reasonable disagreement about the wisdom of such doctrine. See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1354 (2012) ("[T]hat the practice of administrative common law is constitutionally legitimate and not statutorily precluded says nothing about whether developing administrative common law is a good approach for the courts to pursue.").
60 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm), 463 U.S. 29 (1983);
see also Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA.
L. REV. 509,514 (1974).
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homework. They are more likely to introduce policy errors than to correct them. Furthermore, the demand for extensive reason-giving slows
down administrative policymaking and asks for more than agencies can
provide when they operate under uncertainty. 61
As archetypes of this approach, we could choose Justice Marshall's
dissent in the Benzene case, 62 where he would have given the agency
wide latitude to operate under scientific uncertainty, 63 or Justice
Rehnquist's partial dissent in State Farm, which would require less fulsome explanations while also allowing more leeway for the administration's political priorities to affect policy judgments. 64 Accordingly,
"thin" rationality review is the optimal role for courts. 65 Furthermore,
as a matter of fact, such an approach may be more representative of the
daily work of courts, notwithstanding the casebooks' emphasis on rigorous hard look cases. 66
4. Review of Agency Facifinding. - Continuing with that theme,
the administrative supremacist would be highly deferential to agency
findings of fact. This would have two doctrinal implications. First, it
would reject Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB's 67 insinuation that the
APA requires a standard of review more searching than the jury standard.68 In this respect administrative supremacy would support Justice
Scalia's attempts in Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB 69

61 See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 126 ("Where uncertainty prevails, reasons run out, and an
insatiable judicial demand for reasons merely inflicts harm on the legal system.").
62 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 6o7 (1980).
63 Id. at 690 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway
Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (allowing agency to adopt private standard setting in the
face of uncertainty).
64 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1355,
1358 (2016) ("In contrast to thick rationality review, the thin version posits that agencies are (merely)
obliged to make decisions on the basis of reasons. Second-or-higher order reasons may, in appropriate cases, satisfy that obligation.").
66 See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 157 ("[T]hin rationality review fits the bulk of the caselaw
but not all of it."). As noted, some leading critics of anti-administrativists are less strident on this
score. Metzger notes plausible arguments for and against hard look review. See Metzger, supra
note 59, at 1355 ("Again, the conclusion that judicial elaboration of the reasoned decisionmaking
requirement is legitimate says nothing about whether the Court's current account of what reasoned
decisionmaking entails is appropriate."). Michaels would use the threat of hard look review as a
lever to ensure participation of the civil service and the general public within the administrative
process. MICHAELS, supra note 31, at 181-83. If the reviewing court is satisfied that the agency's
procedural structure is "rivalrous, heterogeneous, and inclusive," it should give wide berth to the
agency on the policy merits. Id. at r8r; see also id. at 182-87.
67 340U.S.474(r95r).
68 Id. at 487 (holding that the APA expresses a "mood" of scrutiny more searching than the jury
standard).
69 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
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to reframe the substantial evidence test along more deferential lines. 70
Second, it would reject as both unwise and unmanageable Crowell v.
Benson's 71 (failed) attempt to distinguish between review of ordinary
factfinding under the jury standard and more searching review of jurisdictional and constitutional facts. 72 It would be jury standard all the way.
These positions would flow neatly from supremacist premises. Agencies have superior competence in finding facts 73 and de novo review
frustrates the smooth operation of agencies. 74 At a jurisprudential level,
because the line between law and fact is manipulable and policy-laden,
expert and politically accountable agents should draw it, rather than
courts. 75
5. Jurisprudential Orientation. - The administrative supremacist's
approach transports the restrained Thayerian approach of judicial review in constitutional law to the administrative context. 76 On questions
of substantive law, the court is not to ask whether the agency has identified "the true construction" of the relevant law, but rather whether the
agency "has acted unreasonably." 77 On procedure, the administrative
supremacist carries the mantle of Justice Frankfurter (another committed Thayerian 78 ), who would give agencies ample discretion to "adapt
their decision-making processes to their statutory mandate." 79 On questions of policy, the administrative supremacist's thin rationality review
echoes Thayer's standard for judicial review of legislative policy choices,
which would defer to the political branches unless the policy choice "is
so obviously repugnant ... that when pointed out by the judges, all men

70 Id. at 377; see also Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 685-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (treating review of agency factfinding in informal
proceedings as governed by a jury standard of substantial evidence).
7 1 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
72 Id. at 57-58; VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 28-29, 214.
73 See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 57 (discussing agencies' factfinding advantages).
74 See DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE'S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900-1940, at 46, 48-49 (2014) (discussing progressive frustration with
judicial scrutiny of factfinding).
75 See Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure
Act, 19 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 73-7 4 (1950) (discussing the artificial nature of the law/fact distinction and its policy implications).
76 See LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 94-ro3 (linking Thayer with deference in American
administrative law); Stack, supra note 23, at 299 (identifying Vermeule as a Thayerian).
77 Stack, supra note 23, at 295 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting James B. Thayer,
Constitutionality of Legislation: The Precise Question for a Court, THE NATION, Apr. ro, 1884, at 314).
78 See LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 126 ("Throughout his career, Frankfurter repeatedly
invoked Thayer's famous article, which he regarded as 'the great guide for judges ... of what the
place of the judiciary is in relation to constitutional questions."' (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 300 (Harlan B. Phillips ed., 1960))). Justice Frankfurter, however, was inclined to
require more process when individual, non-economic liberty was at stake. Id. at 13 1 ( citing United
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950)).
79 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 130 (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941)).
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of sense and reflection in the community may perceive the repugnancy."80 As with rationality review of legislation, 81 the administrative
supremacist is disinclined to explore the agency's reasoning process and
motivations so long as the decision falls within this wide range of
reasonableness.
Administrativists with constitutional theories more robust than
Thayerian minimalism can nevertheless fit within this frame. Michaels,
for example, draws on constitutional principles in support of judicial
intervention in administrative action, but with an eye toward ensuring
proper separation of powers within the administrative state. 82 He does
so, however, to restore the mid-twentieth-century equilibrium that translated core constitutional values into a well-functioning administrative
state. Once that is in place, there are no constitutional concerns and the
courts have little role to play besides protecting those structures. As a
first-generation Thayerian would be deferential to the outputs of the
original constitution's political branches, Michaels would defer to the
choices of a properly constituted administrative state at the center of
modern governance. Following Landis, whose work on internal separation of powers Michaels's resembles, 83 this second-generation Thayerian
approach holds that once the proper administrative structures are in
place, the courts should not stand in the way. 84
While Thayer is a helpful touchstone for understanding administrative supremacy, we can also understand this approach as a way of reconciling the modern administrative state with the inherited Diceyan
framework of constitutional law, one that values both (a) legislative supremacy and (b) the rule of law by courts. As neither ultimate lawmakers nor duly constituted courts, administrative agencies are the excluded

80 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 142 (1893); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (arguing courts should defer to a legislative choice unless "a rational and fair man
necessarily would admit that [it] would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law"); LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at r r r.
81 See Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) ("But the law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil
at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a
rational way to correct it.").
82 MICHAELS, supra note 31, at 179-201; see also Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reconstructing an
Administrative Republic, r r6 MICH. L. REV. 959, 963-64 (2018) (reviewing MICHAELS, supra note 31).
83 See Pojanowski, supra note 82, at 966 (noting connections between Landis and Michaels); see
also LANDIS, supra note 32, at 46 (explaining how "administrative power" should offset "executive
power"); Metzger, supra note 30, at 78 (embracing Landis's vision of internal administrative separation of powers as providing legitimacy).
84 Cf LANDIS, supra note 32, at 155 (criticizing courts that have "assume[d] to themselves expertness in matters of industrial health, utility engineering, railroad management, even bread baking'').
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middle under the logic of traditional, Diceyan constitutionalism. 85 Administrative supremacy overcomes this dilemma, and makes space for
the administrative state, through two steps. First, it recognizes the
authority of the legislature to delegate its lawmaking power to administrative agencies, thus nesting them under the legislative supremacy principle of Diceyan constitutionalism. 86 Second, it sharply circumscribes
the rule of law's empire, primarily by embracing a form of legal realism
that dissolves the line between legal interpretation and policymaking.
If most interesting questions of legal interpretation are inextricable from
legislative policy choices, those decisions should fall to the deputized
administrative legislature. 87 The ordinary courts' duties in upholding
the rule of law are thereby limited to patrolling the borders of rationality.
The administrative supremacist solves the Diceyan dilemma by mostly
dissolving it. Delegated legislative supremacy grounds the administrative
state, with the rule of law reduced to a thin residue around its margins.
C. Administrative Skepticism

At the opposite pole of administrative supremacy, a growing body of
literature criticizes the extent and legitimacy of the administrative state.
Skeptics of the administrative state argue that it is illegitimate under the
original understanding of the Constitution and regularly violates the
common law rights that the charter sought to protect. Even further, the
administrative state may instantiate the evils of British monarchism that
the Framers sought to avoid by founding a new republic. Leading figures here are Professors Philip Hamburger, 88 Gary Lawson, 89 Theodore
Lowi, 90 and David Schoenbrod, 91 as well as Bruce Frohnen and George
85 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23 at 20 ("Dicey's conception of the rule of law ... by definition ... excludes the possibility that administrative institutions might wield legal authority under
the constitution.").
86 Cf Metzger, supra note 30, at 72 ("[T]he administrative state today is constitutionally obligatory, rendered necessary by the broad statutory delegations of authority to the executive branch that
are the defining feature of modern government.").
8 7 See id. at 40 (embracing the "broadly accepted legal realist insights about the frequency of
legal indeterminacy, and thus of policymaking, in judicial decisionmaking").
88 See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 12 ("This book ... reveals administrative law to be extralegal, supralegal, and consolidated, and thus a version of absolute power. In a more concretely
legal manner, it shows administrative law to be unconstitutional.").
89 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, ro7 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1231 (1994) ("The post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the
legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution.")
9 o See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM ro7 (2d ed. 1979) ("At its best [modern
governance] is a hell of administrative boredom. At its worst, it is a tightly woven fabric of legitimized privilege.").
91 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 20 (1993) ("The Supreme Court should declare unconstitutional all delegation of legislative power, or ... it should permit only delegation of uncontroversial
details.").
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Carey. 92 Under this approach, courts are obliged to fulfill their judicial
duty to say what the law is, even if (or especially if!) doing so undermines
the regnant administrative state.
r. Review of Legal Interpretations - Substance. - The administrative skeptic rejects deference to agency interpretations of law, even if the
agency is charged with administering the statute. Deference shirks the
judicial duty to say what the law is and introduces a pro-government
bias of dubious constitutional provenance. 93 On questions of statutory
interpretation, the Court should reject Chevron deference and not tarry
with half-measures like a Mead threshold test or even across-the-board
Skidmore 94 deference. Along these lines, Justice Thomas has questioned
Chevron's constitutionality, 95 and similar disquieted rumblings have
arisen from the courts of appeals, headlined by now-Justice Gorsuch's
concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch. 96
Deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations shares
the same flaw, with the added transgression of violating a distinct aspect
of separation of powers. Drawing on Locke and Montesquieu, critics of
Auer deference argue that gathering the power both to promulgate and
interpret the law is the ne plus ultra of the legal tyranny the Framers
sought to avoid, and that deference to agency interpretation allows agencies to engage in such self-delegation. 97 These concerns have led Justices
Scalia and Thomas to question Auer deference 98 and have given Justice

9Z BRUCE P. FROHNEN & GEORGE W. CAREY, CONSTITUTIONAL MORALITY AND THE
RISE OF QUASI-LAW 219 (2016) ("The question we face now is how to maintain or reestablish the
rule of law at a time when our written Constitution is ignored in favor of an operational constitution
impatient, at best, with formal structures, clear rules, and categorical limitations on the rulers'
powers to 'do good."'); see also JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE'S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 4 (2017) ("Administrative power and the administrative state has always suffered a crisis of legitimacy, because of the
tension between administrative power and American constitutionalism.").
93 See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 316; Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1187, 1189 (2016).
94 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
95 See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
96 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-58 (roth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Egan v. Del. River
Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 278 (3d Cir. 2017) Gordan, J., concurring in the judgment); Kavanaugh,
supra note 9, at 2 150-54 (raising concerns about Chevron and suggesting limitations to the doctrine).
97 See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 639-40 (1996) (arguing that Seminole Rock's presumption that agencies are implicitly authorized to have both lawmaking and law-interpreting powers "contradicts a core structural commitment of our constitutional scheme," id. at 640).
98 See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1215 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 620-21 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Egan, 851 F.3d at 2 78 CT ordan, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning Auer along with Chevron).
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Alito pause about the doctrine. 99 Most recently, Justice Gorsuch's
constitutional critique of Auer deference in his concurring opinion in
Kisor v. Wilkie exemplified this approach - and garnered the votes of
Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh. 100
2. Review of Legal Interpretations Procedure. - For the same
reason the skeptics reject Chevron and Auer deference on questions of
substantive law, they should resist any judicial thumb on the scale in
favor of agencies on questions of procedure. If anything, giving agencies
the right to tilt the law in their favor on procedure - the very rules they
must follow in executing policy - cuts closer to the heart of the rule of
law. Furthermore, where the positive law of procedure slows down
agencies, or at least makes them operate in a fashion closer to classical
understandings of separation of powers and the rule of law, the skeptic
might want agencies to adhere to those norms. 101 We can say the same
for judicial doctrines that lead to similar effects, such as the appellate
courts' procedural additions to informal rulemaking 102 or the minority
position in circuit courts that presumes organic statutes with the language "after hearing" require formal adjudication. 103 A skeptic might
also want to force agencies to engage in procedurally heavy rulemaking,
rather than in policymaking by ad hoc adjudication. 104 Tellingly, in
Perez, public interest organizations sympathetic with administrative skepticism filed amicus briefs supporting the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans
of America v. D.C. Arena L.P. 105 rule, which the Supreme Court ultimately
struck down as a procedural burden inconsistent with the APA. 106

99 See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 12 ro (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(noting that "Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas offer substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock
doctrine may be incorrect").
100 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437-41 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(contending that Auer deference violates the separation of powers).
101 Cf Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 15-16), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3347377 [https://perma.cc/9537-gSPP] (decrying how
"[t]he sediment deposited by [the] accretion of procedures can channel agency action into unproductive courses or even dam it altogether'').
102 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring that agencies provide important data during the comment period and respond to "potentially significant" comments, id. at 394); see also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 693 (6th ed. 2019).
103 See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Berry, supra note
4 7, at 545-46.
104 See LOWI, supra note go, at 302--05 (arguing that rulemaking promotes the rule of law better
than agency adjudicative policymaking).
105 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
106 See, e.g., Brief of the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 29,
Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-ro41, 13-ro52); Brief of Washington
Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent
at 14, Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (Nos. 13-ro41, 13-ro52); see also Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206-ro.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

That said, vigorously policing an agency's adherence to procedural
norms will likely be a strategic or second-best maneuver for root-andbranch critics of the administrative state. If the positive law of procedure clearly gives agencies wide sway, deference will be beside the point,
and the administrative state will barrel along unimpeded. Furthermore,
to the extent the skeptic sees the administrative state as an unconstitutional delegation of power to agencies, punctilious attendance to statutory procedure will be little more than tidying the stable after the horse
has left the barn. Statutory and judicially imposed procedural constraints are at best compensating measures and, while the administrative skeptic may be thankful for such small blessings, they do not resolve
the deeper problem.
One non-half measure the administrative skeptic would invoke in
the realm of procedure, however, is the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. The skeptic contends that administrative adjudication denies jury trial rights, imposes the equivalent of criminal fines without
ordinary criminal procedure, and more generally denies legal rights
without de novo treatment by Article III courts. 107 In this respect, the
skeptic would have the courts more directly engaged in ordinary administrative law, though this obviously would require serious reworking of
due process jurisprudence in the administrative context.
3. Review of Agency Policymaking. - Although administrative
skeptics call for increased - indeed, maximal - scrutiny of agency legal
interpretations, they are not likely to call for a similar remedy regarding
agency policymaking. Searching review or revision of agency policy
choices implicates legislative will, not the legal judgment that is proper
to the judicial duty. A skeptic will therefore be hesitant to heed Judge
Leventhal's call to have courts roll up their sleeves and dive into the
policy merits. 108 On the other hand, a skeptic might try to limit agency
power through deregulatory judicial presumptions, such as the
Michigan v. EPA 109 majority's holding that failure to undertake costbenefit analysis is unreasonable.ll 0 Such a tack requires more judicial
involvement in administrative policy, but the skeptic could justify such

107 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 154-55 Uury trial rights); id. at 228-30, 237-57
(criminal character of proceedings). Hamburger also views Chevron's bias in favor of the government as violating due process. See Hamburger, supra note 93, at 1250.
108 See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Leventhal, J., concurring) ("Our present system of review assumes judges will acquire whatever technical knowledge is
necessary as background for decision of the legal questions. .
Our obligation is not to be jettisoned because our initial technical understanding may be meagre .... ").
109 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
110 See id. at 2711-12 (holding it arbitrary and capricious for agency not to consider costs when
deciding whether a regulation was "appropriate and necessary").
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intervention on the grounds that it compensates for underenforced constitutional norms aimed at limiting federal power and delegation. rn
The administrative skeptic could also recommend an approach that
is both more radical and more modest: invalidating legislative provisions on nondelegation grounds.11 2 This approach is radical in that it
calls into question numerous statutory provisions that contain wide delegations to agencies. 113 It is modest in that it respects limits on judicial
authority to fill in gaps where there is no law to apply. Until recently,
reviving the nondelegation doctrine appeared a fringe project, the hobbyhorse of lone rangers like Justice Thomas. Last Term's decision in
Gundy v. United States, 114 where three Justices would have invalidated
a provision under the nondelegation doctrine and a fourth showed interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine in a later case, takes such
arguments off the wall. 115 This is especially so given that Justice
Kavanaugh, who later in the Term was amenable to Justice Gorsuch's
skeptical critique of Auer deference, 116 did not sit for Gundy. 117
An example of a nondelegation approach to review of policy decisions is Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in the Benzene case, where he
would have held that Congress's lack of guidance on risk-threshold policy was an unlawful delegation to OSHA. 118 This is not to say any
111 See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. r, 3 (1994) ("Where
unconstitutional institutions are allowed to stand based on a theory of precedent, the Court should
allow (or even require) the creation of compensating institutions that seek to move governmental
structures closer to the constitutional equilibrium.").
112 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457,487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("On
a future day ... I would be willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence
has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of separation of powers."); L0WI, supra note
go, at 300-or (calling for a revival of the nondelegation doctrine); SCH0ENBR0D, supra note gr, at
165-79 (same).
113 See SCH0ENBR0D, supra note gr, at 13 ("Stopping delegation ... would have produced the
most dramatic change in government since the Civil War."); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives.").
114 139 S. Ct. 2 II6 (2019).
115 See id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (contending that delegating to the Attorney General
the power to decide retroactive effect of a statute would violate the nondelegation doctrine); id. at
2 13 r (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) ("If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort. But because a
majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for
special treatment.").
116 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)
("I agree with Justice Gorsuch 's conclusion that the Auer deference doctrine should be formally retired.").
117 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2II6; see also id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) ("In a future case with
a full panel, I remain hopeful that the Court may yet recognize that, while Congress can enlist
considerable assistance from the executive branch in filling up details and finding facts, it may
never hand off to the nation's chief prosecutor the power to write his own criminal code.").
118 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 6o7, 686-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
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uncertainty is an unlawful delegation - the Framers recognized the impracticability of an absolute separation of powers. 119 But once we cross
the line between filling in small blanks and administrative legislation, the
Court must strike down the provision under the nondelegation doctrine.
4. Review of Agency Facifinding. - The administrative skeptic also
challenges deference to agency factfinding. As with previous objections,
the case against deferential review turns on the Constitution. Depending on one's theory, deference to administrative factfinding may violate
Article Ill's vesting of the judicial power in the courts, violate the
courts' duty of independent judgment, or flaunt due process by depriving litigants of their rights to adjudication in common law courts and
before an impartial adjudicator. 120 The Constitution therefore bars
courts from applying the APA's "substantial evidence" review provision,
regardless of whether it is as lenient as the jury standard or reflects the
slightly more searching mood of Universal Camera. 121 Such objections
may extend to any kind of adjudicative factfinding. 122 Alternatively,
the objection may pertain to a narrower subset of findings, such as those
affecting "core private rights to life, liberty, and property," which include
fines and forfeitures, but not the withholding of privileges and rights
created by public law. 123
5. Jurisprudential Orientation. - Administrative skepticism reintroduces classical, Diceyan constitutionalism to American administrative law. The classical commitment to ordinary courts as the ultimate
arbiters of the law precludes deference to agencies on legal questions.
Treating agency policymaking discretion as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power insists on locating legislative supremacy only within
the actual Congress, either as a conceptual matter or because the rules
of the original, written Constitution preclude delegation of the legislative power to agencies.
Such an arrangement, as a contemporary critic explains, tracks
Dicey's constitutionalism, which by focusing solely on courts and legislatures as legitimate legal actors "excludes the possibility that administrative institutions might wield legal authority under the

119 Id. at 673; see also Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the
constitutional decision to delegate power to "fill up the details" from unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (ro Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825))).
12
For an excellent overview of these objections, see Evan D. Bernick, Is Judicial Deference to
Agency Fact-Finding Unlawful?, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 42-58 (2018).
121 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 485-87 (1951) (analyzing the APA's "substantial evidence" standard and holding that the APA expresses a "mood" of scrutiny more than a
searching jury standard).
122 See HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 318-19 (suggesting blanket incompatibility between the
Constitution and deference to any adjudicative factfinding by non-Article III courts).
123 Bernick, supra note 120, at 30, 39 (emphasis removed); see Lawson, supra note 89, at 1246-48.
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constitution." 124 It is more purely Diceyan than is modern administrative law in the United Kingdom, whose constitutionalism Dicey originally theorized. There, while the doctrine of judicial review is more
congenial to de novo review of agency legal conclusions than in the
United States, courts can be quite "submissive" toward administrative
decisions that exercise delegated policymaking discretion. 125
D. Administrative Pragmatism
A third position neither chastises the administrative state nor submits governance to its mercy. Rather, it seeks to reconcile the reality of
administrative power, expertise, and political authority with broader
constitutional and rule-of-law values. The primary means for doing so
is development of administrative common law doctrine that implements
or supplements positive law like the APA or the Constitution. This is
the largest and, relatedly, least precise category of approaches to administrative law I will be describing here. Adherents to this approach,
which I will call administrative pragmatism, vary among themselves on
particular questions, but a family resemblance nevertheless emerges. In
fact, one could do reasonably well on an administrative law exam by
using the pragmatist doctrinal approach as the skeleton of a study outline.
r. Review of Legal Interpretations - Substance. - On questions of
statutory interpretation, deference is often appropriate, but only if the
agency interpretation passes certain legal tests. These tests could come
in the form of a contextual, multifactor approach to Mead like Justice
Breyer's 126 or a more rule-like interpretation of Mead, 127 or through the
invocation of certain exceptions, such as a presumption that Congress
has not delegated interpretive authority on major questions or jurisdiction.128 Like the administrative supremacist, the pragmatist recognizes

124 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 20; see also Stack, supra note 23, at 296 n.8 (describing
Hamburger's approach as Diceyan).
125 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 43 (quoting David Dyzenhaus, The Politics of Deference:
Judicial Review and Democracy, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 279, 286
(Michael Taggart ed., 1997)). Hamburger argues that Dicey's concept of the rule of law was too
thin, focusing only on courts and "understating the more basic point that the government could
constrain subjects only through the law." HAMBURGER, supra note 7, at 280. Dicey thus "did not
clearly foreclose the possibility that [a breach of law] might consist of violating a statute giving
effect to administrative regulations." Id. at 280-81.
126 See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,222 (2002)(announcing a standard-like approach to Mead).
12 7 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 827-30 (2002) (describing a rule-like approach to determining
when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn
Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV.
467, 472 (2002) (identifying a legislative drafting convention that indicates delegation).
128 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (major questions); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (same); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290,
296-301 (2013) (rejecting exception for jurisdictional questions).
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that there are some underdetermined legal questions over which agencies should have ultimate legal authority because of technical competence, political accountability, or both. Implicit in this judgment is that
on unclear questions, there is no preexisting law to declare, but rather a
policy choice to make among the plausible options. 129 That said, even
if the agency chooses a permissible interpretation within the Chevron
"space," a pragmatist court may nevertheless demand evidence that the
agency engaged in reasoned decisionmaking to get there. 130
Like supremacists, pragmatists usually justify deference as an implied congressional delegation of lawmaking authority, though this is
also usually 131 understood as a fiction that is useful for the sound allocation of decisionmaking power. 132 Pragmatists, however, are less willing to extend that implied delegation to situations in which the underlying justification for deference is unlikely to apply. In other words, for
the pragmatists, the moderate legal realism about law's indeterminacy
that justifies deference on ordinary questions of law does not extend to
the metalaw of deference, where courts can calibrate the respect they
afford agency legal interpretations.
A similar story follows for agencies' interpretations of their own regulations. Rather than heeding Justice Thomas's call to abandon Auer
deference, 133 pragmatists seek to domesticate the doctrine to avoid abuse
and promote the purposes it serves. Hence, the emerging exceptions for
interpretations of regulations that parrot statutes 134 or interpretations
that are inconsistent or spring unfair surprises on the regulated community.135 We can call this a "Footnote 4" approach to Auer, after the reference that qualified, but declined to overrule, the doctrine in Perez v.
Mortgage Bankers Association. 136 As with Chevron, the pragmatist
gives Auer a Step Zero, rather than unfailingly applying it or abolishing
12 9 See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 821, 823 (1990) ("[W]hoever interprets [unclear legislation] will often have room to
choose between two or more plausible interpretations. That sort of choice implicates and sometimes
squarely involves policy making.").
130 Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and
"Skidmore Weight," 112 C0LUM. L. REV. 1143, 1162 (2012); see also Ronald M. Levin, The
Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1270-71 (1997) (arguing
that Step Two should resemble arbitrary and capricious review).
131 But see Merrill & Watts, supra note 12 7, at 4 72 (grounding deference in legislative drafting
conventions).
132 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L.
REV. 2009, 2009, 2013 (2011).
133 See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1225 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in
the judgment).
134 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) ("An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when ... it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.").
135 See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155-56 (2012) (withholding deference to inconsistent interpretation that resulted in "unfair surprise").
136 See 135 S. Ct. at 1208 n-4 (listing exceptions to Auer deference).
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it altogether. 137 Exemplary here is Justice Kagan's majority opinion
preserving Auer in Kisor v. Wilkie, which framed the argument for deference in Chevron terms and provided threshold tests for its applicability. 138
With Auer, the common law character of deference doctrine is even
more pronounced. The useful fiction of congressional delegation that
cloaks Chevron deference is not so readily available when an agency
delegates interpretive authority to itself. 139 One could say that when
Congress delegates interpretive authority by passing unclear legislation,
it is also delegating authority to decide when to exercise that authority,
and that Auer deference simply allows the agency to time when to make
those policy choices. But such an argument is in tension with Mead and
its progeny, which often require a fine-grained inquiry into whether it is
reasonable to presume a delegation of authority. A blunt presumption
of delegated authority will be unappealing to many pragmatists. Furthermore, this explanation would add yet another epicycle to a theory
of delegation that appears increasingly verbal. Rather, any modulation
of Auer doctrine will turn on comparative assessments of agency competence and accountability, as well as on ensuring the smooth operation
of judicial review and administrative procedure more generally.
2. Review of Legal Interpretations Procedure. - Here the picture
is more mixed. Tracking the supremacist's defense of deference on procedural questions, a pragmatist could argue that institutional competence, political accountability, and the tradeoffs inherent in allocating
resources between procedure and substance point toward deference
along these lines. This explains the strong trend toward the D.C. Circuit's
deferential approach to agency decisions on whether an organic statute
prescribes formal or informal adjudication, 140 as well as the lack of
scholarly uproar in response to that deferential approach. 141 Similarly,
while Florida East Coast Railway took no account of the pre-APA

13 7 See Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1449, 1467-1503(2011) (identifying and evaluating potential threshold tests for applying Auer
deference).
138 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412-14 (2019) Uustifying Auer in terms of Chevron-like
presumptions of delegation for reasons of institutional competence and regulatory uniformity); id.
at 2416-18 (identifying limits on Auer's application); see Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means
for the Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Kisor Deference Doctrine, YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT Gune 26, 2019), https://yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-futureof-auer-deference-the-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine [https://perma.cc/EA6 S-2 GG VJ (summarizing Kisor's "Chevron-ization of Auer deference" and its "independent and substantially narrowing steps that are reminiscent of, though not identical to, the Court's development of a step zero
for Chevron deference").
139 Cf Manning, supra note 97, at 639 (distinguishing the delegations in Chevron and Auer).
140 See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1481-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also
Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2006); Berry, supra
note 4 7, at 545-46.
141 But see Berry, supra note 4 7, at 545-46.
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doctrine that framed the backdrop of formal rulemaking, 142 mainstream
administrative law has little problem with leaving the choice about formal rulemaking to the agency's discretion, which is to say interring formal rulemaking. 143 Furthermore, many pragmatic theorists held no
brief for the now-defunct Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which sought to
burden, and therefore limit, agencies' choice to modify interpretive
rules. 144
On the other hand, pragmatists should not be confused with supremacists along these lines. The pragmatists' delegation theory of Chevron
provides little support for deference on interpretations of the APA,
which no agency has particular responsibility to administer. Even with
respect to organic statutes that agencies do administer, one can readily
imagine a fine-grained, pragmatist approach that finds it unreasonable
to infer that Congress delegated authority to administer a procedural
provision of the statute with force of law. 145
Notwithstanding Vermont Yankee, pragmatist courts also facilitate
substantive hard look review by requiring agencies to bulk up the APA's
notice of proposed rulemaking and the resulting statement of basis and
purpose. As with arbitrary and capricious review of policymaking, discussed below, there is a connection with positive law: the APA requires
judicial review, and judicial review is not meaningful without some kind
of reasoned explanation that includes, among other things, responses to
important objections, connections between the record facts and the chosen policy, and some indication of deliberation about policy alternatives.146 Similarly, notice would be meaningless - and policy formation
would veer toward irrationality - if interested parties did not have access to a detailed explanation of the proposed rule and the data upon
which the agency formed its tentative policy judgments. 147 As with the
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 4ro U.S. 224 (1973).
See LAWSON, supra note 49, at 287 ("Indeed, since FECR was decided ... formal rulemaking
has virtually disappeared as a procedural category.").
144 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Administrative Law Scholars in Support of the Petitions at
7, 9, Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015) (Nos. 13-ro41, 13-ro52); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 56166 (2000) (criticizing Paralyzed Veterans).
145 Cf Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649-50 (1990) (refusing to defer to an agency's
interpretation of preemptive effect of a private right of action provision on grounds that Congress
conferred that authority to the courts); Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918, 925-28 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (Williams, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court should not defer to an agency's interpretation
of whether an amendment to a statute under which the agency had been delegated authority applies
retrospectively or only prospectively).
146 Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654-55 (1990) (explaining how
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), is consistent with Vermont Yankee).
147 See Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 528, 530 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (stating that because the "process of notice and comment rule-making is not to be an
empty charade," id. at 528, it is essential for agencies to provide wide disclosure of proposed rules
and supporting data, as well as fulsome explanation for their decisions and responses to comments).
142
143
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delicate balance in substantive review between enforcing legal values
and respecting administrative expertise, pragmatist courts seek to optimize the mix of procedural protections and agency flexibility. 148 Courts
modulate this supervision through supple doctrines like the logical outgrowth test and harmless error, 149 or by adopting, out of practical necessity, stopping rules that limit notice and comment. 150 This administrative common law of procedure is a hallmark of the post-New Deal
mainstream of pragmatic administrative law and maintains a long run
of scholarly support.1 51
Finally, notwithstanding their rejection of Paralyzed Veterans, pragmatist jurists and scholars embrace nuanced tests to distinguish procedurally valid interpretive rules and policy statements from invalidly
promulgated legislative rules. 152 A simpler - and discretion-enhancing approach would have courts deprive policy statements and interpretive
rules of force-of-law benefits, but pragmatic concerns about agencies
using nonlegislative rules for prelitigation coercion lead pragmatist
courts and scholars to supervise administrative procedure more closely
here. Again, we see a judicially calibrated mixture of supervision and
deference that attempts to strike a balance between the rule of law and
discretion.
3. Review of Agency Policymaking. - In reviewing agency policy
choices, the administrative pragmatist again balances legal values with
the agency's expertise and accountability. Resisting Judge Leventhal's
call to have courts scrutinize the administrative record, but unsatisfied

148 See Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, ro5 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting
that the sufficiency of a statement of basis and purpose "depends on the subject of the regulation
and the nature of the comments received" (quoting Action on Smoking & Health v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1zr6 (D.C. Cir. 1983))).
149 See, e.g., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that
agency's procedural error at the notice phase of rulemaking was harmless); Int'! Union, United
Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 626 F.3d 84, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 2oro) (stating that a
change between proposed and final rules is permissible when it is a "logical outgrowth" of the original notice, and expounding on what qualifies as such an outgrowth).
150 See, e.g., Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990) (seeking to avoid the "neverending circle" that would occur if parties had the right to comment on the agency's response to
other comments).
l5l Peter L. Strauss, Statutes that Are Not Static- the Case of the APA, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 767, 768 (2005) (arguing that "whenever the Supreme Court is considering a return to original understandings [of procedural statutes] it should accord substantial weight to contemporary
consensus the profession and lower courts have been able to develop in interpreting law").
15 2 See, e.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1ro6, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (offering a four-question test for whether a purported interpretive rule is in fact a legislative
rule); see also Pierce, supra note 144, at 548 (praising American Mining Congress). For a critique of
such tests, see John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894-97, 91427 (2004) ("Given the level of generality at which the D.C. Circuit articulates such criteria, it is difficult,
at best, to draw meaningful distinctions between interpretive and legislative rules." Id. at 922.).
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with Judge Bazel on 's purely procedural approach, 153 the pragmatist settles on the "hard look" review that demands a reasoned explanation for
agency action that connects the chosen policy with the administrative
record. As demonstrated by the majority opinion in State Farm, this
review can at times be exacting. 154 State Farm's rhetoric, however,
leaves a reviewing court flexibility to approach a case with a light or
heavy touch, depending on the stakes and the general sense of whether
the agency is implementing its mandate in good faith. 155 As with review
of legal questions, these tests have the flavor of common law inspired
by, but not directly derived from, positive law. There is little interest in
what the framers of the APA meant or were understood to mean when
they codified arbitrary and capricious review. 156
4. Review of Agency Facifinding. - The pragmatist neither questions the constitutionality of agency factfinding nor advocates for a supine posture across the board. Rather, Universal Camera's whole-record
rule, 157 applied with a mood somewhat less forgiving than the jury
standard, suffices for review of agency facts. That said, informal

153 Compare Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en bane) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring) (contending that patrolling agency procedure suffices to ensure reasoned administrative
decisionmaking), with id. at 68-69 (Leventhal, J., concurring) (arguing reviewing courts should be
more willing to engage with the merits of agency policy). Lawson has argued that the current
arbitrary and capricious review incorporates both types of concerns - that is, procedural and substantive. See Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for
Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 318-19 (1996).
15 4 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983)
(closely scrutinizing the agency's interpretation of the record data).
l55 See id. at 43 (listing a number of factors that courts can consider in determining whether an
agency rule is arbitrary or capricious). There is some indication that the Court is likely to be more
skeptical of policy decisions based on politics than those based on expertise. See Jody Freeman &
Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA· From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 5 1, 9396. This tendency has come under criticism, even from those not associated with the supremacist
camp. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) ("[W]hat count as 'valid' reasons under arbitrary and capricious review
should be expanded to include certain political influences from the President, other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political influences are openly and transparently
disclosed in the agency's rulemaking record.").
15 6 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 400 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
("There are contexts, however, contexts of fact, statutory framework and nature of action, in which
the minimum requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act may not be sufficient." (quoting
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972))); Beermann & Lawson, supra
note 19, at 85 7 ("Beginning in the late 1960s ... judges on the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit - with considerable support from the surrounding political and academic
communities - decided that the procedures for informal rulemaking provided by the APA were
inadequate to allow effective legal control of agencies that were widely perceived as vulnerable to
industry capture. Accordingly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the lower federal courts essentially rewrote the
APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions to require extensive procedural machinery .... ").
157 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,493 (1951) (holding that the APA requires
judicial deference to agency findings "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole" (quoting Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-ro1, 61 Stat. 136, 148 (1947))).
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patterns or practices could emerge, such as a likelihood of heightened
scrutiny when an agency head overrides an administrative judge's factual finding. 158 Furthermore, the Universal Camera test applies across
policymaking formats, not just for formal adjudication, 159 even though
there are reasonable arguments that the APA prescribes a more nuanced
treatment in other contexts. The distinctions among policymaking formats fall by the wayside in the face of the pragmatic concern over
providing a less searching review for informal rulemaking, which affects
far more people than formal adjudications but for which the APA might
require more deference to agencies. 160 Ensuring a rough, sensible balance between administrative prerogative and legal values across the system is more important than parsing those legal weeds.
5. Jurisprudential Orientation. - Administrative pragmatism attempts to transcend the Diceyan dichotomy, which understands public
law as sharply, and exhaustively, divided between supreme legislative
bodies that make law and supreme courts that preserve the rule of law
through authoritative interpretation of those norms. 161 The administrative supremacist emphasizes broad lawmaking powers delegated to
agencies. Inversely, the administrative skeptic rejects the notion that
agencies can wield lawmaking power and would preserve courts' supreme power to interpret authentic legislation and ensure the proper
allocation of constitutional authority. These contrasting approaches
each favor one side of the Diceyan dichotomy to the diminution of the
other, but the pragmatist seeks to recognize lawmaking and interpretive
powers in the administrative agencies while bringing both functions under the rule of law.
Lewans's recent book, Administrative Law and Judicial Deference,
is exemplary in this respect. He contends that judicial deference on
questions of law and policy is appropriate given the authority democratically elected legislatures vest in agencies. 162 This does not, however,
entail a supine judicial posture. Rather, the moral legitimacy of any
exercise of political power depends on all legal institutions respecting
rule-of-law values, like meaningful participation in decisionmaking

158 See, e.g., Kimm v. Dep't of Treasury, 61 F.3d 888, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1995); LAWSON, supra note
49, at 481-82.
l59 See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding the arbitrary and capricious test for factfinding under
informal rulemaking basically identical to the substantial evidence test for factfinding under formal
adjudication).
16 Cf id. at 685 (warning about the "seemingly upside-down application of varying standards"
that would apply if factfinding in informal rulemaking received less scrutiny than formal adjudication).
161 LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 16-21 (sketching this dichotomy). See generally Matthew
Lewans, Rethinking the Diceyan Dialectic, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 75 (2008) (critiquing the Diceyan
dichotomy).
162 See LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 221-22.
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processes and reasoned explanations for policy choices. 163 Therefore,
Lewans argues, judicial review should ensure administrative decisionmaking comports with these basic requirements of legality. 164 Accommodating the administrative state and the requirements of legality
"requires judges to ensure that administrative law is both fair and substantively reasonable," but it does not give judges "a plenary licence to
engage in correctness review. " 165
Thus emerges the hybrid nature of modern administrative governance. While the classical theory of legislative supremacy declines to
explore the legislature's motives, reasoning, justifications, or consistency, under the pragmatist vision the administrative lawmaker must
comply with more robust rule-of-law demands. While the classical theory of legal supremacy gives courts a monopoly on legal interpretation,
the pragmatist recognizes the authority of administrative bodies to interpret the law - within the realm of reasonableness and so long as the
agency's action complies with the rule-of-law requirements of fair participation and reasoned justification that accompany all other exercises
of lawmaking authority. 166
The administrative pragmatist therefore resolves Dicey's dialectic
with a new synthesis that joins legislative and interpretive authority into
one body whose legitimate discretion is nevertheless subject to the rule
of law. If federalism "split the atom of sovereignty," 167 the modern
administrative state is the nuclear fusion of Diceyan constitutional
elements. This process unleashes the energy necessary for modern governance, though judicial supervision is necessary to ensure the balance
and stability of the system as a whole.

II. THE NEOCLASSICAL ALTERNATIVE
Our intellectual inheritance in public law identifies two elements of
constitutional governance: legislative supremacy and the rule of law.
The previous Part has offered three ways to reconcile that dichotomy as
it exists within the administrative state. One approach - administrative supremacy - emphasizes legislative supremacy vested in agencies
via congressional delegation. A second - administrative skepticism emphasizes the rule of law, insisting that courts are the guardians of

163

Id. at 221-23.

164
165

See id.

Id. at 2 ro. We can compare this approach with the judicial interventions recommended by a
supremacist like Landis or Michaels. A pragmatist like Lewans sees the judicial role as ensuring
every decision comports with basic requirements of legality on a retail basis. For Landis or
Michaels, once we are certain the proper infrastructure is in place, the court presumes on a wholesale basis that the agency has met the basic requirements of legality. See, e.g., MICHAELS, supra
note 31, at 180.
166 Recall, deference on questions of law here presupposes that choosing among reasonable interpretive options is an underdetermined lawmaking policy choice.
167 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.Thornton,514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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legal interpretation while regarding noncongressional lawmaking as ultra vires. A third, pragmatist alternative gives neither prong primacy,
but rather seeks to integrate both values into a judicially supervised and
modulated administrative state.
This Part presents an alternative approach: neoclassical administrative law. This approach is skeptical of judicial deference on questions
of law but takes a much lighter touch on review of agencies' procedural
and policymaking choices. Put another way, it combines the skeptic's
understanding of the judicial role on questions of law with the supremacist's approach to questions of discretion and policymaking. Like administrative pragmatism, it seeks to find an equal place for politically
responsible policymaking and the rule of law in the administrative state.
Yet it rejects the pragmatist's blurring of the line between law and policy, drawing instead a sharper division of responsibility between courts
and administrative agencies. Neoclassical administrative law recapitulates Dicey's sharp distinction between rule of law and legislative
supremacy but nests it within an administrative state that serves as a
deputized lawmaker.
Like much legal scholarship, this Article's interpretive work is both
descriptive and normative. It pulls together disparate strands of the
jurisprudence, identifies their underlying commitments, and offers an
argument for why that way of understanding administrative law is the
best way forward. 168 I do not contend this is the only way to understand
the current law of judicial review of administrative action. In fact, the
existing state of the law is in sufficient flux that neutrally theorizing
without remainder is simply not possible here (if it ever is 169). Nor need
I establish that neoclassical administrative law is the best of all possible
regimes as a matter of ideal legal and political theory. A best-of-allpossible-worlds theory may be too out of step with current doctrine to
be a contender.
That said, given the contested terrain in administrative law and the
plausible alternative theories on offer, I am obviously constructing this
framework because I find it appealing as a matter of principle. Neoclassical administrative law preserves the supremacy of law by ensuring
courts have the final say on questions of legal interpretation, an ambit
168 The jurisprudentially inclined will see a parallel with Professor Ronald Dworkin's "fit and
justify" method, in which the interpreter identifies the legal principles that pass a threshold level of
fit with the existing corpus of law and make that body of law a justified whole. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 65-68 (1986). One does not have to embrace Dworkin's more ambitious argument that all law is interpretive to find this method useful. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra
note 6, at 8-9 (using a Dworkinian approach to defend his theory of administrative law); John
Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 L. & PHIL. 357, 357 (1987) (arguing that
Dworkin "promotes reflective understanding of the practical argumentation" in legal discourse
while "overestimat[ing] practical reasoning's power to identify options as the best and the right").
16 9 See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-22 (2d ed. 20II) (discussing
the limits of purely descriptive accounts of law); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring
Originalism, ro5 GEO. L.J. 97, 1ro-12 (2016) (same).
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that extends beyond the bounds that conventional deference doctrines
presently contemplate. At the same time, it upholds legislative supremacy by conferring greater respect for the policy choices of Congress and
its administrative delegates. Such an approach will conform administrative doctrine to a classical understanding of separation of powers and
legal interpretation, but without encouraging courts to wade into vexed
questions of regulatory policy or deconstruct the administrative state
single-handedly.
The descriptive and diagnostic discussion proceeds in two steps.
This Part will identify the strands of doctrine and scholarship supporting neoclassical administrative law and then identify the commitments
underlying this approach to judicial review. Part III will make a case
for these commitments and respond to objections that the approach does
not fit contemporary administrative law in a justifiable fashion.

A. Neoclassical Administrative Legal Doctrine
Neoclassical administrative law, simply put, seeks to sharpen the line
between law and policy in administrative law, with the consequence of
increasing judicial responsibility on questions of law while decreasing it
on matters involving policymaking discretion. Explicating neoclassical
administrative law does not require one to work entirely from scratch.
While neoclassicism is by no means a full-fledged movement in administrative law, there is a group of scholars and jurists whose work demonstrates this tendency. I will be drawing on their work but also, when
necessary, will fill in gaps by appealing to more general guiding principles. These conclusions are tentative and, for reasons discussed below,
may depend on excavating the original law created by the Administrative
Procedure Act and subsequent legislation.
A quick note on doctrinal implications. The following section explains what neoclassical administrative law would recommend were its
practitioners operating on a clean slate. A number of its conclusions
clash with contemporary administrative law doctrine. As with any critical approach, there will be questions about the proper extent of reform
and the pull of stare decisis, but presently I will bracket those matters.
r. Review of Legal Interpretations - Substance. - The neoclassical
administrative lawyer, like the skeptic, rejects deference to agency interpretations of substantive law. The neoclassicist would replace deference
on questions oflaw with either de novo review or something like Skidmore
deference. 170 Although the Court has not heeded calls to overrule Chevron

170 As a practical matter, even de novo review is likely to blur into something like Skidmore
deference, as reviewing judges are likely to confer at least some mild epistemic authority on expert
agencies, much in the way, for example, the Tenth Circuit likely treats Second Circuit opinions on
securities litigation with more respect than those of a district judge in New Mexico.
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or Auer deference, the neoclassicist can share the skeptic's enthusiasm
about recent decisionmaking at the Court. An expanded Step Zero and
increasingly strong Step One have blunted both of those deference doctrines' impacts. 171 It has been more than three years since the Supreme
Court invoked Chevron to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute.172 Auer deference has come under more withering criticism from a
number of Justices, with four calling for its outright reversal in Kisor v.
Wilkie and the Chief Justice standing by the doctrine in part because the
Kisor majority's reformulation of Auer conceded so much to its critics. 173
Like the skeptic, the neoclassicist may draw on constitutional arguments about the judicial power or due process and (especially) traditional conceptions of the judicial duty. What distinguishes the neoclassicist, however, is an emphasis on legislation governing judicial review.
A neoclassicist is more likely to invoke the original understanding of the
Administrative Procedure Act and the principles of judicial review it
sought to codify. Chevron is wrong not because (or not just because) it
departs from the general understanding of judicial duty, but because it
departs from the particular duty to attend to additional, particular positive law on judicial review, namely the APA. Here we can invoke
Professor John Duffy's critique of Chevron as a product of administrative common law that contradicts positive law on judicial review entrenched in the APA. 174
Similarly, Professor Aditya Bamzai's recent historical spadework
challenges Chevron's claim that the decision (and, implicitly, the APA)
was adopting earlier judicial practice on judicial review. He argues that
the deferential language in pre-APA decisions was a product of the mandamus posture in which many administrative challenges arose. 175 In
most non-mandamus proceedings, however, courts were much less
deferential, although they did give respect to contemporaneous and

171 See, e.g., Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) ("But in light of all the
textual and structural clues before us, we think it's clear enough that the term 'money' excludes
'stock,' leaving no ambiguity for the agency to fill."); King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015)
(holding that the Chevron doctrine does not apply to a "question of deep 'economic and political
significance' that is central to this statutory scheme" (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134
S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014)); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (placing limits on when Auer deference applies).
172 See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016).
173 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(contending, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Kavanaugh, that the Court should overrule
Auer); id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) ("[C]ases in which Auer deference is warranted largely
overlap with the cases in which it would be unreasonable for a court not to be persuaded by an
agency's interpretation of its own regulation.").
174 John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 19399 (1998) (offering an APA-based critique of a common law Chevron doctrine).
175 Bamzai, supra note 19, at 958.
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customary interpretations. 176 Bamzai argues that the most plausible interpretation of the APA's judicial review provision incorporates this nondeferential background law, a conclusion that would provide support in
the positive law for the neoclassicist's resistance to Chevron-style deference.177 Not all administrative common law is suspect, but when there
is statutory law on the matter, the courts should do their best to discern
and follow it.
For this reason, the neoclassicist finds unpersuasive the argument
that deference comports with the judicial duty to say what the law is
because the law tells them to defer. 178 To be sure, a neoclassicist sympathetic to Duffy's and Bamzai's arguments will also take seriously
Professors Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts's claim about original
legislative drafting conventions indicating when Congress wants courts
to defer to agency interpretations of law. 179 Probing such conventions
and reconciling them with a nondeferential APA are interesting, important projects for the neoclassicist to pursue, as is further work on the
original understanding of the APA. 180 Any of these inquiries might offer
reasons for deference and thus require the neoclassicist to confront the
larger constitutional and jurisprudential questions about deference more
squarely. Nevertheless, the neoclassicist will not accept the more generalized presumption of implicit congressional delegation of interpretive
authority that many Chevron advocates deploy. Rather, the neoclassicist
sees this explanation as a legal fiction delicately veiling a functionalism
that dare not show its face.
A similar pattern follows on judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations. The neoclassicist might be sympathetic to claims
that such agency self-delegation violates separation of powers and that
deference is a dereliction of judicial duty. But another line of attack
appeals to the neoclassicist interested in descending from the heights of
constitutional theory. There is strong evidence that Seminole Rock,
which gave rise to Auer deference, was not understood as conferring
general Chevron-like power to agencies. 181 In fact, it is plausible to read
the case as an unremarkable application of Skidmore-type deference:
176 Id. at 943-47, 969-71 (tracing the persistence of the approach over time). Although the Court
was more likely to defer after the New Deal, see id. at 977-81, Bamzai argues there was a reversion
to the traditional approach in the backlash that led up to the APA, see id. at 985-87.
177 See id. at 985-89.
178 See Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1983).
179 See Merrill & Watts, supra note 127, at 472-74; see also Duffy, supra note 174, at 199-200
(suggesting that particular grants of authority in organic statutes could justify deference).
18 For a recent argument that the "original meaning" is at least open to the Chevron doctrine,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, ro7 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1657 (2019).
181 See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 40, at 52-53 ("Seminole Rock began as a doctrine
with significant constraints, at a vastly different moment in administrative law.... Over the course
of thirty years, Seminole Rock became completely divorced from these modest and restrained origins.").
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when, as in Seminole Rock, an agency offers a virtually contemporaneous interpretation of a regulation it just authored, that interpretation
will have power to persuade, especially when courts are more inclined
toward original intentionalism than they are today. 182 Tracking Duffy's
and Bamzai's arguments about Chevron deference, the neoclassicist can
contend that it is plausible to read the APA as incorporating this approach (Seminole Rock was handed down just before the APA's enactment), which would cast Auer's expansion of the doctrine as a counterstatutory exercise of administrative common law. Justice Gorsuch's
concurrence in Kisor took just this tack before also raising the constitutional concerns animating the administrative skeptic's critique of Auer. 183
Implicit in this argument is the rejection of the functionalist justification of Chevron. This is grounded not only in conclusions about the
APA, but also in a greater faith in the determinacy of legal materials in
hard cases. This belief challenges Chevron's legal realist premise that
all interpretive uncertainty involves policy choices calling for political
accountability and nonlegal expertise. 184 This is not to say that every
statutory provision will be tractable to standard lawyers' arguments.
Congress passes statutes that insist agency action be "reasonable" or
maintain an "adequate margin of safety." Unless such phrases are fixed
terms of art, the neoclassicists would not insist that reviewing courts
have the final say as a matter of legal interpretation. Indeed, they would
say there is no interpretation to be done. Rather, they would file this
question as one delegated to the agencies subject to arbitrary and capricious review. 185
As a practical matter, judicial review of agency interpretations of law
would resemble Justice Scalia's rigorous application of Chevron Step

182

See Pojanowski, Seminole Rock, supra note 40, at 88 (summarizing this argument).
See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2432-37 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that Auer is inconsistent with the original meaning of the APA); id. at 2428-29 (contending
that Auer's progenitor, Seminole Rock, was originally understood as an application of Skidmorestyle deference).
184 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2597-99 (2006) (linking Chevron with the legal realist's rejection of
interpretive formalism).
18 5 This position is perhaps reconcilable with Professors Lawrence Solum and Cass Sunstein's
recent argument that Chevron requires deference only in the "construction zone" of the interpretation/construction distinction. Lawrence B. Solum & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction 46 (Dec. 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3300626 [https://perma.cc/W 3FZ-XHBN].
Formalists disagree about the interpretation/
construction distinction, and even those who embrace it may disagree about the breadth of the
construction zone. Solum and Sunstein contend that deciding whether, as in Chevron, a "source" of
pollution refers to an entire facility or any of its components is a question of construction. Id. at 4.
Other formalist interpreters may limit "construction" to more open-ended terms like "reasonable"
or "feasible." See Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2153-54 (accepting deference to agency construction
of those terms).
183
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One 186 and the Supreme Court's penchant in recent years to sidestep
deference by pronouncing statutes clear or, in the words of a recent
Justice Gorsuch opinion, "clear enough." 187 It would involve a very
strong Step One in which the judicial interpreter does not cede matters
to agencies when the formal legal materials point one way - even if the
interpreter appreciates that there are plausible, if weaker, arguments
pointing the other way. This Step One would be paired with a dissolution of Step Two into arbitrary and capricious review on matters that
are simply not tractable to formalist craft. In other words, it would
simply take Step Two outside the realm of legal interpretation, properly
so called. 188 This reformulation of judicial review without Chevron,
which I have explained at greater length elsewhere, 189 also addresses the
concerns of more recent judicial Chevron skeptics, such as Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh, both of whom bristle at deferring on lawyers'
questions without also insisting that judicial review doctrine should
plunge courts into the weeds of regulatory policymaking. 190
Put another way, the neoclassical approach to judicial review of legal
questions divvies up what conventional administrative law deems "Step
Two" into domains of (a) legal questions reviewed de novo or under the
Skidmore standard and (b) policymaking choices subject to the more
deferential arbitrary and capricious review. 191 Orthodox teaching on
Chevron denies any such line between legal interpretation and policymaking on unclear questions, filing both types of uncertainties under the
broader label of "interpretation." 192 A more precise account separates
the two based on the modes of reasoning characteristic of the inquiries.
As Professor Randy Kozel and I have argued, it is useful to distinguish
between what we call "expository reasoning" - the search for an authoritative text's original public meaning or intent - and "prescriptive
reasoning" - normative and empirical inquiries about the best choice
186 See Scalia, supra note 37, at 516 ("An ambiguity in a statute ... can be attributed to either of
two congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or
(2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to the agency.
When the former is the case, what we have is genuinely a question of law, properly to be resolved
by the courts. When the latter is the case, what we have is the conferral of discretion upon the
agency, and the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted within
the scope of its discretion .... ").
187 Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018). The Court has not reached
Step Two since June 2016. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142-46 (2016).
188 See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112,
l 15 (201 l).
189 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 Mo. L. REV. ro75, ro85-87 (2016).
190 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (roth Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2150-54 (raising concerns about Chevron and suggesting limitations to the doctrine).
191 See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 188, at 161-62.
192 See id. at 141-46 (explaining that Chevron "is often read as collapsing the distinction between
explication and policymaking," id. at 143).
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to make within the ambit of one's discretion. 193 Under this approach,
which entails the commitment to formalism discussed below, 194 expository reasoning is the best understanding of what legal interpretation is,
in contrast to the policy judgments sometimes also lumped under Chevron
Step Two. For the neoclassicist, legal questions are meaningfully distinguishable from policy questions and are reserved for courts. 195
Justice Kavanaugh's concurring opinion in Kisor captures this distinction. In explaining how the majority's preservation of Auer ceded
central ground to the doctrine's critics, he explained that "[i]f a reviewing court employs all of the traditional tools of construction, the court
will almost always reach a conclusion about the best interpretation of
the regulation at issue." 196 Consequently, "the court then will have no
need to adopt or defer to an agency's contrary interpretation." 197 On
the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh conceded, "some cases involve regulations that employ broad and open-ended terms like 'reasonable,' 'appropriate,' 'feasible,' or 'practicable. "' 198 Because those terms "afford
agencies broad policy discretion," 199 the proper response for a reviewing
court is to "allow an agency to reasonably exercise its discretion to
choose among the options allowed by the text of the rule. But that is
more State Farm [review of policy] than Auer." 200
The neoclassicist therefore extends the domain of Step One to absorb
legal questions upon which reasonable parties could disagree, while
shifting over to the domain of arbitrary and capricious review questions
unamenable to formal legal craft. An approach like this resonates with
recent critics of Chevron and Auer deference who worry about courts
ceding the power to say what the law is. The neoclassical approach here
embraces one of the most prominent skeptical critiques of administrative law doctrine in recent years. Still, it is hardly something new under
the sun. As Professor John Dickinson noted nearly a century ago, this
more searching review echoes Lord Coke's bid to place the Crown under

19 3

Id. (identifying and defending the cogency of this distinction).

194

See infra sections II.B.1, pp. 895-98, and III.A, pp. 903-08.
For another argument along these lines, see Larry Alexander, The Constitutional Limits of
Chevron Deference: Meaning Versus Policy 2 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-359, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3247186 [https://perma.cc/SUH7-9GZ4]
("The basic distinction is between deference to an agency's interpretation of Congress' meaning,
which is constitutionally forbidden, and deference to an agency's delegated policy choice, which,
within limits, is constitutionally permitted.").
196 Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2448 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment).
l95

197
198
199
200

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2448-49.
Id.
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the supremacy of law. 201 Somewhat less archaically, the neoclassicist
approach recalls Chief Justice Hughes's position in Crowell v. Benson
on review of legal questions, 202 and is likely closer than contemporary
doctrine to the original understanding of the APA. 203 As we shall see,
however, this particular rejection of legal deference does not lead to a
broader rejection of the administrative state. The neoclassicist seeks to
restore the judicial role while stopping short of a constitutional revolution. In this respect, judges who are uneasy about deference but do little
more than nibble at the edges of the administrative state are neoclassicists in practice, if not in theory.
2. Review of Legal Interpretations Procedure. - As with judicial
review of questions of substantive law, a neoclassical approach to agencies' conclusions about procedure would not be deferential and would
focus on the original law laid down by the APA and organic statutes.
Sometimes this will affirm current doctrine or even suggest agencies
have more discretion than current law affords. In other circumstances,
an accurate understanding of procedural law may point to less freedom
than courts give agencies today.
On the side of upholding existing doctrine, the neoclassicist's commitments to the original APA will likely support the Court's rulings in
Vermont Yankee and Perez. The standard textualist arguments about
legislation striking a compromise and encouraging interpreters to respect the means the legislature chose to advance its ends 204 can readily
apply to the intricate procedural scheme Congress chose when it crafted
the APA. 205 Indeed, Vermont Yankee emphasized this point precisely
when explaining that the procedural choices Congress selected are, for
the courts at least, a ceiling and not a floor upon which the courts should
stack additional stories. 206
Although courts have mostly confined Vermont Yankee's principle to
comment procedures in informal rulemaking, this line of argument could
extend further. For example, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who offered
the harshest criticism of Auer deference in Perez, had no problem rejecting the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans rule, which served as a

2 0l See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 75-ro4 (1927) (tracing the English historical roots of "the demand that the
determination of rights should in the last analysis be a matter for the courts alone," id. at 75).
202 See 285 U.S. 22, 45-46 (1932).
203 See Bamzai, supra note 19, at 987. See generally John Dickinson, Administrative Procedure
Act: Scope and Grounds of Broadened Judicial Review, 33 A.B.A. J. 434 (1947) (illustrating contemporaneous understanding of the APA).
204 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 540-41 (1983);
John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2oro).
205 Cf United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 448 (1988) (holding that the comprehensive nature
of the statutory regime entailed the exclusion of unmentioned remedies and procedures).
206 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542-46 (1978).
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procedural check on Auer deference. 207 In fact, Justice Scalia's sole
misgiving about overruling the rule was that Auer allowed agencies to
game the system by sequentially issuing interpretive rules. 208 N evertheless, he thought that was a problem with Auer, not a reason to pile procedural common law atop the APA. 209 For Justice Scalia, a return to
the APA on both fronts - rejecting Auer deference and Paralyzed
Veterans - would set things aright. 210
Similarly, while on the D.C. Circuit, then-Judge Kavanaugh objected
to his court's insistence on bulking up rulemaking procedures in the
teeth of Vermont Yankee. 211 Specifically, he contended that additional,
judicially imposed requirements for notices of proposed rulemaking and
statements of basis and purpose are unmoored from the APA's text and
flout Vermont Yankee's teaching that administrative common law
should not upset the procedural balance Congress struck in that statute. 212 The work of scholars like Professor Kathryn Kovacs supports
his argument that the layers of administrative procedure courts impose
on informal rulemaking are inconsistent with the APA. 213 But Justice
Kavanaugh is no administrative supremacist. His recent judicial and
scholarly writings have also raised questions about Chevron. 214 Like
Justice Scalia in Perez, Justice Kavanaugh demonstrates that serious judicial scrutiny on questions of law can run together with a more restrained review of administrative procedure when the positive law
points toward such discretion.
But the neoclassical approach to procedure would not always promise sweetness and light for agencies. It might cast doubt on the emerging
20 7 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("I agree with the Court's decision, and all of its reasoning demonstrating the incompatibility of the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans holding with the Administrative Procedure Act.");
id. at 12 13 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I concur in the Court's holding that the
doctrine first announced in Paralyzed Veterans ... is inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) and must be rejected." (citations omitted)).
208 See id. at 1211-12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
209
210

Id.
Id. at 1211-13.

211 Similarly, on the academic front, Professor Jack Beermann rejects Chevron doctrine while
also, along with Lawson, calling for the courts to apply Vermont Yankee beyond the narrow context
of the comment procedures in informal rulemaking. See Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron
Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 779, 782-84 (2oro) (offering ten reasons to overturn Chevron); Beermann & Lawson, supra
note 19, at 860 ("There are, however, a significant number of important administrative law doctrines
that do seem to fly squarely in the face of all but the most unreasonably narrow understandings of
the Vermont Yankee decision. These doctrines ... are all ripe for reconsideration.").
212 See Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
213 See Kovacs, supra note 19, at 533-46.
214 See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 418-26 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (arguing that Chevron should not apply to major rules);
Kavanaugh, supra note 9, at 2 150-54 (raising more general criticisms about Chevron doctrine).
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tendency in appellate courts to give agencies Chevron deference on
whether they must proceed through formal or informal adjudication. 215
Under the same logic, agencies would not receive Auer deference on
interpretations of their own procedural regulations. There is also an
argument that Florida East Coast Railway incorrectly interpreted the
original law of the APA on when agencies must engage in formal, trialtype rulemaking, as opposed to notice-and-comment rulemaking. 216
Upsetting that ruling would certainly bring a shock to the administrative system - one that the metalaw of stare decisis would have to take
into account before any revision - but taking the original APA and its
background law seriously could remove that argument from "off the
wall" status. 217
3. Review of Agency Policymaking. - A neoclassicist is more forgiving than the administrative skeptic or even the administrative pragmatist on review of agency policymaking. At risk of anachronism, we
could identify Justice Thomas as an avatar of this approach. In his later
writings, he is deeply skeptical of judicial deference on findings of
law. 218 On the D.C. Circuit, however, he penned an opinion Uoined by
then-Judge Ginsburg) that gave agencies latitude to engage in policy
experimentation under uncertainty. 219 Similarly, then-Judge Kavanaugh
warned against expanding "State Farm's 'narrow' § 706 arbitrary and
capricious review into a far more demanding test." 220 Under a neoclassical approach, arbitrary and capricious review would be closer to the
rational basis test than the more vigorous applications of hard look review. 221 And, notwithstanding then-Judge Kavanaugh's concerns about
overreach, this more deferential posture may be closer to actual judicial

215 See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2006)
(citing Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1480-82 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (overruling circuit
precedent presuming formal adjudication to adopt Chevron approach); see also Berry, supra note
4 7, at 545-46.
216 See Kent Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. ARGUEND0 1, 8-ro (2017).
21 7 For an argument for why the procedure itself is not off the wall as a matter of policy, see
Aaron L. Nielson, In Defense of Formal Rulemaking, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 241 (2014). Nielson
argues: "If applied in appropriate circumstances, formal rulemaking - with its emphasis on accuracy and transparency- could improve the administrative process." Id.
218 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712-14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
219 See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 956 F.2d 309, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding
that "an agency has some leeway reasonably to resolve uncertainty, as a policy matter, in favor of
more regulation or less").
220 Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 248 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
221 Cf Dep't of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2019) (holding "a court may not
reject an agency's stated reasons for acting simply because the agency might also have had other
unstated reasons"). But see id. at 2575 (stating that a decision is arbitrary and capricious when "an
explanation for agency action ... is incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency's
priorities and decisionmaking process'').
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practice in the appellate trenches, even if agency reversals in cases like
State Farm are more salient in casebooks and doctrinal rhetoric. 222
For the neoclassicist, deference on policy questions is the corollary of
nondeference on legal questions. As explained above, rejecting Chevron
deference disaggregates the inquiry formerly known as "Step Two" into
(a) cases in which lawyers' arguments cut both ways such that it is hard
to say the matter was clear, even if a reviewing judge thinks one interpretation is better on balance than its rival, and (b) cases in which there
is no surface upon which traditional lawyers' tools can have purchase,
such as commands that the agency be "reasonable" or act "in the public
interest" when those phrases are not terms of art. Returning to the distinction above, judgments about the exposition of an authoritative legal
text - its public or intended meaning - are distinct from reasoning
about what norms ought to govern within a space of delegated discretion. 223 The latter requires empirical and normative reasoning beyond
the legal formalist's interpretive toolkit, which leads such an interpreter
toward deferential judicial review.
Abandoning Chevron would eliminate the Step Two reasonableness
inquiry for questions falling under category (a), while taking a more deferential stance toward agencies under category (b), which includes arbitrary and capricious questions mislabeled as unclear questions of legal
interpretation. 224 The underlying premise here is that, while courts can
and should make close calls about legal questions, they lack the capacity
and accountability to do more than patrol the outer bounds of reasonableness when it comes to agency policymaking. In this respect, the neoclassicist shares the supremacist's judgment about the reach of judicial
craft on policy choices while rejecting the supremacist's (and the pragmatist's) doubts about the autonomy and determinacy of law within its
own domain.
A further argument returns to the APA. There is reason to believe
that arbitrary and capricious review was understood when the APA was
enacted as closer to rational basis review under constitutional law than
contemporary hard look review. 225 The standard "restate[d] the scope
of judicial function in reviewing final agency action," 226 which appears

222 See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 165 (citing David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA.
L. REV. 135 (2oro)) (describing empirical findings that "courts do not seem to be engaging in 'hard
look' analysis" when they review rationality of agency decisions).
223 See supra pp. 888-89.
224 See Pojanowski, supra note 189, at ro86-87.
225 See Metzger, supra note 59, at 1299-1300 (collecting evidence to this effect).
226 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT ro8 (1947) (first citing S. REP. No. 79-752, at 230 (1945); and then citing
Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 674,
S. 675, and S. 9I8, 77th Cong. 1150, 1351, 1400, 1437 (1941)); see also NLRB v. Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1950) (stating that APA did not make "any material change in
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to have been more lenient than hard look. 227 In line with this understanding, early arbitrary and capricious cases under the APA applied
standards similar to rational basis review. 228 Rational basis-type language continued into the r96os, 229 though it declined with the rise of
hard look review in the D.C. Circuit. 230 If this understanding is correct,
then, in addition to more general ideas about the judicial role, the neoclassicist can rely on original, positive law to set the standard of review.
Such an approach defies the pragmatists' post-APA administrative common law and the skeptics' stance that such open-ended grants of administrative authority violate the nondelegation doctrine.
4. Review of Agency Factfinding. - As a matter of first principles,
there are interesting open questions about how a neoclassical approach
would regard factfinding by agencies. While it is unclear what form of
pre-APA judicial review is the best analogue to modern judicial review
of agency factfinding, 231 the neoclassicist can set that question aside by
looking to the APA itself. For this reason, a neoclassical approach could
the scope of review"). One should take citations to the Attorney General's Manual with a grain of
salt, for it was in the author's interest to tilt judicial interpretation of the APA to the government's
benefit. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, go NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1682-83 (1996).
22 7 See LAWSON, supra note 49, at 700 (stating that the APA "clearly intended to codify preexisting law, which consistently interpreted the phrase 'arbitrary or capricious' to permit only the
most minimal judicial review of agency decisions" (citation omitted)).
228 See, e.g., Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 695 (9th Cir. 1949) ("The question
of 'reasonableness' [under the APA] reduces itself to whether the order is a rational conclusion and
not so 'unreasonable' as to be capricious, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion."); see also Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d at 326 (linking arbitrary and capricious standard with substantial
evidence standard, both of which are satisfied if "the decision has a rational and substantial basis
in the evidence and the law'').
229 See, e.g., Carlisle Paper Box Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 1, 6 (3d Cir. 1968) ("Administrative action
may be regarded as arbitrary and capricious only where it is not supportable on any rational basis."
(quoting NLRB v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., Indus. Marking Prods. Div., 342 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir.
1965))); E. Cent. Motor Carriers Ass'n v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 591,594 (D.D.C. 1965) ('"Arbitrary' and 'capricious' are to be understood in their legal sense.
Accordingly these words
mean 'without rational basis."').
230 The strength of the rational basis test is up for debate. For an argument that APA-era rational
basis review was stricter than how constitutional rational basis review is generally understood today, and thus roughly within the range of standard hard look review, see Evan D. Bernick,
Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 849 (2018).
Current doctrine does not equate arbitrary and capricious and constitutional rational basis review.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.g (1983).
231 The most obvious framework is Crowell's approach, which provides jury-standard review for
ordinary facts and greater scrutiny of factfinding that implicates jurisdictional and constitutional
questions. 285 U.S. 22, 57-58 (1932). Even setting aside questions about whether those distinctions
are manageable, see VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 28-29, 214, the less deferential review the Court
of Chancery may have applied to the findings of special masters or delegated trials may be a better
starting point for a neoclassical approach than review of agency factfinding by a court at law, cf
John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 1620,
1620 (1974) ("[T]he Court of Chancery did indeed have and exercise fact finding power.
[W]hen
the court delegated factual disputes for trial at law, the verdict was advisory and nonbinding.").
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resemble the Court's recent approach in Biestek v. Berryhill. 232 There,
in interpreting the term "substantial evidence" in the Social Security Act,
both Justice Kagan in the majority and Justice Gorsuch in dissent read the
term to resemble the jury standard. Justice Kagan cited Consolidated
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 233 a pre-APA case whose reading of substantial
evidence is similar to the jury standard. 234 Justice Gorsuch stated that
Congress borrowed the substantial evidence standard "from civil litigation practice" for review of jury verdicts. 235 If the APA incorporated
that standard, that would provide a positive-law basis for substantial
deference based on the whole record. 236 If, on the other hand, the Court
in Universal Camera was correct about Congress wanting a more searching "mood" of review, the more rigorous standard of review would
instead govern. 237

B. The Neoclassicist's Jurisprudential Commitments
The previous section has pulled together a number of doctrinal and
scholarly strands: (a) growing skepticism about legal deference; (b)
doubts about whether procedural common law favors the agency or not;
and (c) arguments that reviewing courts should stay their hands in reviewing agency policy judgments. This is admittedly a composite construction; current administrative law is not in a tidy state, after all.
But the composite sketched above is not like tracing a theory based
on cases appearing in odd-numbered volumes of the U.S. Reports. Rather, three commitments tie together neoclassical administrative law: (a)
belief in the autonomy and determinacy of legal craft; (b) the priority of
original, positive law over judicial doctrine; and (c) hesitance to engage
in judicial deconstruction of the administrative state through constitutional law. The jurisprudential foundations unearthed here are in many
ways more recognizable than the disparate doctrinal positions they can
underwrite. In recent years the Supreme Court's center of gravity has
shifted in a formalist and traditionalist direction, while its modest constitutional holdings have not tracked its anxious rhetoric about the administrative state. Neoclassical administrative law may become the equilibrium resting point of a "faint-hearted" formalist Court. 238
r. Autonomy of Law and Legal Reasoning. - The neoclassical alternative resists mainstream administrative law's working assumption that

2 32
233

139 S. Ct. l 148 (2019).
305 U.S. 197 (1938).
234 Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1155 (citing Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229).
23 5 Id. at 1159 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
236 See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359,367 (1998) (treating the APA
as incorporating the jury standard); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2 26, at ro9-ro.
23 7 Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,487 (1951).
238 Cf Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-62, 864 (1989)
(describing most originalists as "faint-hearted" originalists, id. at 862).
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challenging legal questions are inextricably intertwined with policymaking judgments. Its faith in the autonomy and determinacy of law
is closer to the interpretive formalist perspective of classical common
lawyers, whose approach administrative skeptic Philip Hamburger outlined in Law and Judicial Duty, as well as that of neoformalists like
Professor Lawrence Solum. Hamburger contends that the classical
English understanding of law consists in identifying the authoritative
lawmaker's intention, an act that is different from engaging "in a sort of
moral and political discernment of verities beyond the law of the
land." 239 Solum contends that formal legal materials play a much larger
role than the casual legal realism of the American academy suggests,
resolving the vast majority of contested cases. 240
This is not to say the neoclassicist denies the existence of hard questions of legal interpretation. There will be questions in which arguments
from statutory text, structure, canons, purpose, history, and the like
point toward more than one reasonable answer. The neoclassicist, however, would maintain that choosing which one is stronger is more a question of lawyerly judgment than first-order policy preferences. The corollary of this belief in the autonomy of legal reasoning is the conclusion
that it is generally inappropriate, or at least beyond the central case of
judicial duty, 241 for courts to engage in complicated policymaking in the
way that legislators or administrators do. 242
These presuppositions about the autonomy of legal reasoning have
implications for the kinds of interpretive tools the neoclassicists favor.
The neoclassicist is more likely to see the text's original meaning,
23 9 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 116 (2008); see id. at 48 ("[Classical
English lawyers] found legal obligation in the will or intent of their lawmaker. Not surprisingly,
common lawyers rapidly assimilated the view that intent rather than eternal justice was the measure of legal obligation ... focusing not merely on the intent of the lawmaker, but more specifically
on the intent of legislative acts.").
240 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and Legal
Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2487-88 (2014) (book review) ("The data strongly suggest that
law and legal preferences play an important role in explaining judicial behavior."); id. at 2476
("[T]he failure of legal variables to explain the outcomes in the reported decisions of the Supreme
Court would be perfectly consistent with the hypothesis that the law clearly determines the proper
legal characterization of almost all of the events and occurrences that make up our social world.").
241 This does not mean proper interpretation never requires repair to policymaking judgment. A
statute could direct an interpreter to engage in such activity and, absent an alternative, authorized
decisionmaker, a court would have to develop law in the gaps. Nevertheless, the further we move
from legal judgments to policymaking decisions, the less comfortable the formalist is about the
allocation of authority. This will have implications for judicial review of agency policymaking,
when there is an alternative decisionmaker.
242 The development of common law norms, when legitimate and necessary, also implicates
broader normative judgment, especially on the margins or in cases of first instance. That said, even
when judges engage in first-order reasoning as opposed to formal interpretation, there are important
distinctions between their reasoning and straightforward policymaking. See John Finnis, On Reason
and Authority in Law's Empire, 6 LAW & PHIL. 357, 376 (1987) (arguing that "such a judgment
will be both constrained and shaped by existing law in a way quite unlike any other moral judgment'').
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statutory context and structure, linguistic canons, and perhaps historical
intent 243 as appropriate tools for interpretation, rather than normative
canons or legislative purpose at a high level of generality. 244 Legal interpretation (as opposed to policymaking) will tend toward formalism
and originalism. In turn, neoclassical administrative law will be skeptical of interpretive tools that require predictions about consequences or
direct assessments of contemporary norms. The more that consequences, purpose (especially at a high level of generality), and contemporary values enter the interpretive picture, the less tenable the distinction between law and policymaking. 245 For courts deploying those tools,
Chevron deference would be more acceptable, if not inevitable, since
there are strong arguments that agencies are better suited to "making"
this law in the gaps rather than "finding" the better of the competing
arguments. 246
These considerations shed light on previous attempts to distinguish
between judicial review of law and policy. In Crowell v. Benson, the
Court sought to draw such a sharp distinction, insisting on rigorous judicial review of questions of law while generally deferring on factual
findings and determinations of what we would now call questions of
policy. 247 Formally, the Court addressed the distinction between law
and fact, reviewing the latter with deference unless factfinding implicated jurisdictional or constitutional questions. 248 Crowell preceded the
rise of legislative rulemaking and presumed most administrative

243 There are those who think legislative intent is not a myth and that it can at times provide
rules of decision that can dictate results in a formalist fashion. See RICHARD EKINS, THE
NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 9 (2012) ("Legislative intent ... is an intelligible idea, instantiated in countless legislative acts and central to how one should interpret the statutes the legislature
enacts."); Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 89, 9698 (2015) (reviewing EKINS, supra) (noting affinities between Professor Richard Ekins's intentionalism, which is skeptical of legislative history, and traditional textualism).
244 The question of what to do about normative or substantive canons is important here. To the
extent a second-order "law of interpretation" structures the use and priority of normative canons,
they might be able to enter the formalist's toolbox. Cf William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The
Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. ro79, r r 2 7-28 (2017) (contending that substantive canons
may be part of the positive but unwritten law governing legal interpretation). A neoclassical court's
willingness to deploy such substantive canons will depend on the character of the reasoning such
canons require and the determinacy of that metalaw of interpretation.
24 5 See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 878 (1930).
246 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Dunsmuir: A View from South of the Border, 31 CAN. J. ADMIN.
L. & PRAC. (SPECIAL ISSUE: A DECADE OF DUNSMUIR) 197, 198-99 (2018).
247 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45-47 (1932) (holding that agency findings on questions of
law "are without finality," id. at 45, and subject to plenary judicial review).
248 Id. at 46-4 7 (prescribing deferential review unless said review implicates "constitutional rights
to be appropriately enforced by proceedings in court," id. at 46); id. at 54-55 (providing a similar
carve-out for jurisdictional facts).
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policymaking would occur through formal adjudication. 249 Crowell did
not neatly separate factfinding and policymaking, a category that would
crystallize with the APA's sharp distinction between questions of law,
fact, and policy. This distinct category of policymaking would become
more salient with agencies promulgating broad, forward-looking, legislative rules. Nevertheless, the reasons Crowell saw for fact-deference
track the competencies we associate with agency policymaking. Deference provided a "prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive method"
for resolving questions "peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task." 250
Therefore, although Crowell predates the tripartite law-fact-policy
distinction we discuss today, its logic points toward deference on policymaking. In this light, Crowell suggests a division between (a) questions
of law (for courts) and (b) questions of policy and most questions of fact
(for agencies). As Vermeule has ably catalogued, that compromise collapsed over time. 251 He contends that this collapse was inevitable, a
product of a distinction between law, fact, and policy that is inherently
unstable. 252
The neoclassicist offers an important qualification to that story.
Crowell's distinction between review of law and policy was unstable
only so long as it rested on the interpretive antiformalism that dominated at the time of the New Deal and the subsequent Legal Process
era. The neoclassicist's legal formalism, however, marks a return to the
pre-legal realist thought that, "while aware of the blurriness in the lines
between making, executing, and interpreting law, nevertheless insist[ed]
that the division of these activities was coherent in theory and estimable
in practice." 253 To be sure, the tenability of such a classical approach to
the legal craft in a post-realist world is an important challenge neoclassical administrative lawyers must address. 254 But if it stands, the theory
has better resources to patrol the line between law and policy than the
strong purposivists who founded - and lost - the Crowell regime.
2. The Priority of Original, Positive Law. A second feature that
emerges is the neoclassicist's prioritization of original, positive law over
judge-made doctrines. The neoclassicist takes the APA and other

24 9 See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 32 (arguing that Crowell "essentially neglected the central
role of legislative rulemaking in the modern administrative state" and "presupposes that adjudication ... would be a principal method, or even the principal method, of administrative decision-making").
25 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46; see also id. at 4 7 (invoking the agency's "sound practical judgment"
and stating that finality of factfinding is necessary for the efficiency of the legislative scheme).
251 See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 25-37.
2 52 See id. at 28 ("What would happen if the arguments that persuaded Hughes to commit factfinding to administrative tribunals - arguments from justice, the inadequacy of the common law,
expertise, and efficiency - also applied to law-interpretation, for example?'').
253 See Pojanowski, supra note 189, at 1089-90.
254 See infra Part III, pp. 903-18.
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organic statutes seriously and is inclined to reject judicial doctrines that
depart from legislative instructions on point. When combined with the
neoclassicist's interpretive formalism, this leads to "APA originalism." 255
The neoclassicist will look to the original understanding of the APA and,
in the event that the APA prescribes concrete rules of decision, favor
treating those instructions as fixed, enduring law, not a springboard for
common law that contradicts that entrenched understanding. 256
This is not to say that neoclassical administrative law views all
administrative common law as inherently suspect. Positive law has priority, not exclusivity. Administrative common law might exist as a freestanding rule of decision in the absence of legislation on point and can
work as a backdrop that informs the contours of codified administrative
law. In fact, the neoclassicist understanding of what the APA requires
for judicial review of legal questions may be informed by the background administrative common law of review that Congress incorporated in the statute upon enactment. 257 In this respect, the neoclassicist
approach to the APA resembles "original methods" or "original law" approaches to constitutional originalism. 258
Recognition of the hierarchy of statutory law over judicial doctrine,
not skepticism about legal craft, motivates the neoclassicists' closer attention to the original APA or other legislation on procedure and judicial
review. It is the neoclassicists' faith in interpretation that gives them
confidence that an (often open-ended) statute like the APA can offer
interpretive guidance. Therefore, these two commitments to legal craft
and original positive law are not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing. But just as "original law" or "original methods" originalism in constitutional law is distinct from living or common law constitutionalism,
neoclassical administrative law is skeptical of judicial doctrine that contravenes the original law laid down in the APA or other governing
organic statutes.

255 For a thorough and thoughtful defense of this position, see Bernick, supra note 230; and also
see Michael E. Herz, Breaking News: New Form of Superior Agency Guidance Discovered Hiding
in Plain Sight, JOTWELL (Feb. 16, 2017), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/breaking-news-new-form-ofsuperior-agency-guidance-discovered-hidi ng-in-plain-si ght/ [https://perma.cc/89M5-5 KFV] (describing the phenomenon of "APA originalism").
25 6 Cf Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 169 (providing a normative defense of this originalist
approach in the constitutional setting).
257 See Bamzai, supra note 19, at 990-95 (review of statutory interpretation); Pojanowski, Seminole
Rock, supra note 40, at 98 (review of regulatory interpretation).
2 5 8 See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, ro3 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 769 (2009)
(arguing that "the proper positive interpretive approach for the United States Constitution requires
reference to the [uncodified] interpretive rules, including the legal interpretive rules, that were applicable to that Constitution" at the time of enactment); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory
of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 849-50 (2015) (explaining how unwritten background law can inform or be incorporated into a regime of positive law).
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3. Constitutional Modesty. - It is possible that an originalist approach to our Constitution condemns much of the contemporary administrative state, APA and all, to the dustbin of eighteenth-century history.
Hence, the administrative skeptics, who share many of the neoclassicists' interpretive commitments, call for the revival of the nondelegation
doctrine, question the legitimacy of administrative adjudication, condemn independent agencies and insulated administrative law judges,
and launch constitutional arguments against Chevron and Auer deference.
The neoclassical approach, however, turns down the constitutional
temperature. It is more resolutely focused on reforming ordinary administrative law doctrine in light of classical legal thought while accepting as a given a legal order that may be difficult to square with the
classical understanding of our original Constitution. Although the
Supreme Court has turned up the heat on deference doctrines and curtailed common law encrustations on administrative procedure in recent
years, it has dodged 259 or rejected 260 nondelegation challenges, and its
separation of powers interventions have been weak on practical consequences, even if they are occasionally strong on rhetoric. 261 This tendency to avoid large-scale constitutional engagement with the administrative state is what puts the "neo" in neoclassicism. Whether this third
facet is something we can square with the first two commitments is another challenge for the neoclassicist. 262
4. The Neoclassical Vision of Public Law. - As in Part I, we can
map this doctrinal approach and its presuppositions onto the categories
of Diceyan constitutionalism. Neoclassical administrative law recapitulates the Diceyan dichotomy in which courts are supreme in finding or
identifying the law but defer to the political branches in the formulation
and enactment of that law. This classicism, however, comes with a twist
that justifies the "neo" prefix.
First, the classical dimension. Neoclassical administrative law follows Dicey's insistence on judicial responsibility for the rule of law by
rejecting deference to agency interpretations of ordinary substantive and
procedural law. In interpreting organic statutes, procedural legislation,

259 See Dep't ofTransp. v. Ass'n of Arn. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233-34 (2015) (avoiding question
of delegation to a private entity by holding that Amtrak is a governmental body for regulatory
purposes).
260 Whitman v. Arn. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 465, 474 (2001) (holding that a statute instructing agency to set standard'" requisite to protect the public health' with an 'adequate margin
of safety,"' id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012)), did not violate the nondelegation doctrine).
261 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1, 2053-54 (2018) (holding that an SEC ALJ was
an officer of the United States and was therefore unconstitutionally appointed, thus avoiding the
question of for-cause removal); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477,483,492 (2oro) (finding double layer of for-cause removal for Board members unconstitutional
while leaving in place for-cause protections of supervising SEC Commissioners).
262 See infra section III.C, pp. 912-17.
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or administrative regulations with the force of law, courts have the final
say without deference. As noted above, this orientation implies a formalist approach to statutory interpretation, since it presupposes a
sharper line between legal judgment and lawmaking will. Strongly purposive or dynamic approaches to interpretation directly challenge that
line in a way that textualist or more formal flavors of intentionalism do
not. For Dicey, as for Blackstone, the courts are the oracles of the law. 263
Neoclassical administrative law also echoes the Diceyan principle of
legislative supremacy, under which courts are loath to question the
political branches' discretionary lawmaking choices. Neoclassical administrative law's constitutional modesty accepts Congress's choice to
confer policymaking discretion upon agencies. Furthermore, the neoclassicist's skepticism of hard look review recognizes a form of delegated
legislative supremacy. Such thin rationality review acknowledges that
agencies have been given sovereign authority to exercise discretion so
long as their choices do not countermand the positive law that frames
their ambit of power.
The twist here has two interrelated aspects. First, and most obviously, legislative supremacy here pertains not only to Congress but also
to the administrative agencies that receive delegated power from that
supreme legislature. Whereas the classical Diceyan picture excludes
as a conceptual matter discretionary authority outside the supreme legislature, neoclassical administrative law recognizes the innovation of
delegated legislative power. It respects exercises of administrative lawmaking within the ambit of the agency's discretion because the law recognizes that the superior legislature gave the inferior agencies this power
and, even though agencies are inferior to legislatures, it is not the office
of the courts to exercise or question legislative will.
Such deference is also consistent with judicial supremacy on questions of law. An agency's lawmaking discretion does not extend to overstepping the authority the legislature has conferred on it or the positive
law - that is, the regulations - the agency has legislated for itself.
This is not to reintroduce the language of "jurisdictional" exceptions to

263 On questions of fact, Diceyan thinking on the role of courts, juries, and separation of powers
appears unclear, or at least less strident in its support for the jury than other classical common
approaches. See Ian Christopher Fletcher, "This Zeal for Lawlessness": A. V. Dicey, The Law of the
Constitution, and the Challenge of Popular Politics, I885-I9I5, 16 PARLIAMENTARY HIST. 309,
316 (1997) ("Dicey was no Blackstonian, at least with regard to this legal institution."). Dicey explained that the "law of England now knows nothing of exceptional offences punished by extraordinary tribunals" without juries. DICEY, supra note 21, at 127. On the other hand, he explained
that, while a New Zealand statute abolishing trial by jury would violate the common law of England,
it would nonetheless be valid because Parliament passed a statute indicating that colonial legislation
should not be held void simply because it was repugnant to English law. See id. at 49-5 r.
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deference, 264 but rather to recognize that the scope of the agency's authority is a question of law and, under the classical Diceyan perspective,
a question for the court to decide. The scope may be broad, such as
requiring an agency to act in the public interest, and in those cases there
may be very little law to apply. But when the legislative instructions to
the agency are more amenable to formal, lawyerly argument, such as
whether tobacco is a drug, 265 whether a "source" of pollution refers to a
smokestack or the facility as a whole, 266 or whether the National Labor
Relations Act overrides the Federal Arbitration Act's solicitude for arbitration,267 the agency cannot expand or narrow its authority beyond
the court's best interpretation of what the legislature delegated.
The second, related aspect of the neoclassical twist pertains to constitutional law. Unlike Dicey's England, the United States has an entrenched, written constitution. As noted, it is possible that the formalist
approaches to legal interpretation favored by neoclassical theorists could
lead a court to conclude that the original Constitution precludes the delegation of legislative and procedural discretion to administrative agencies. This is not a conceptual objection; one can imagine a constitution
that authorizes the legislature to delegate limitless power to agencies.
Rather, the objection pertains to the actual, positive law constituting the
powers of our government's separated branches and the limits thereof.
Because of our particular, original Constitution, the neoclassical administrative lawyer's accommodation of legislative supremacy may collide
with her interpretive formalism and commitment to the rule of law.
Whether this tension is fatal to neoclassical administrative law is
discussed below. In the meantime, it is worth comparing neoclassical
administrative law's reconciliation of the two Diceyan principles with
its competitors'. Unlike the pragmatist's hybridization, which subjects
administrative lawmaking to hard look review and imposes moderate
judicial scrutiny on legal questions, neoclassical administrative law distinguishes and institutionally separates legislative supremacy and the
rule of law. Unlike supremacism, which marginalizes Diceyan rule of
law through courts, and unlike skepticism, which rejects the possibility
of administrative lawmaking power, the neoclassical approach maintains a place for both principles in administrative governance. In short,
we see classical Diceyan public law theory adapted to and persisting in
a new regulatory environment.

264 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296-301 (2013) (rejecting as incoherent a Chevron
exception for questions of agencies' jurisdiction).
26 5 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 131 (2000).
266 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
26 7 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
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III. CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS
Administrative law struggles to reconcile the competing principles of
legislative supremacy and the rule of law. Like the pragmatist - and
unlike the supremacist and skeptic - the neoclassicist refuses to subordinate either of the two basic principles. In contrast to the pragmatist,
however, the neoclassicist endeavors to maintain a neater, more formal separation of powers within the context of modern governance.
Part II has sketched the basic features of neoclassical administrative
law and suggested how this approach to judicial review would play out
on the ground. Thus far this Article captures a "mood," if not a movement, emerging in contemporary administrative law, and brings it forward for more systematic consideration. One could do so to condemn
such a nascent approach before it takes hold, but that is not my intention. Rather, the neoclassical approach is worth exploring and merits a
place as a serious contender in administrative law and theory. This final
Part seeks to establish as much, working through some of the neoclassical theory's basic presuppositions.
No theory of any interest lacks vulnerabilities, and this Part will
begin to address challenges facing neoclassical administrative law. The
defense will draw on both descriptive claims about existing doctrine
and normative argument to show that the neoclassical approach has a
substantial, and justified, foothold in existing administrative law. Even
if critics remain unconvinced, understanding the neoclassicists' commitments and their departure from the alternatives illuminates how other
approaches to judicial review negotiate our inherited commitments to
legislative supremacy and the rule of law.

A. Autonomy of Law and Legal Reasoning
Neoclassical administrative law adopts rigorous review on questions
of law. It grounds that position on a formalist approach to interpretation
that presumes a sharper line between law and policy than much administrative law and scholarship. 268 The objection to this stance, leveled in
varying degrees by supremacists and pragmatists, is that this faith in
the autonomy of law is deluded, na"ive, or at least excessive: any interesting question of legal interpretation gives rise to linguistic ambiguity;
canons of interpretation are indeterminate; appeals to purpose require a
value-laden choice regarding the level of generality; and choosing an
interpretation based on whatever purpose you select requires expertise
that judges lack. 269

See supra section II.B. 1, pp. 895-98.
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (listing dueling
268
269
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If this is so, Chevron and Auer suit judicial review to a tee. Step One
gives courts the power to resolve the litigated cases that are quite
clear. 270 At the same time, deference doctrines allow politically accountable agencies to make the value choices associated with sorting out dueling canons, identifying the level of generality of statutory or regulatory
purpose, and making the consequentialist predictions necessary for implementing the chosen statutory policy. If this is so, more stringent review of legal questions is a misguided power grab by unaccountable,
unequipped judges. Relatedly, the neoclassicist's rejection of administrative common law in favor of deriving rules of decision from the APA
is a nonstarter if we cannot extract determinative meaning from that
statute.
One of the neoclassicists' challenges going forward is addressing and
rebutting this realist skepticism at the jurisprudential level. Candidly,
much here turns on interpretive method. The extent to which appeal to
craft determinacy is plausible goes a long way toward deciding whether
neoclassicism is promising or misguided. Furthermore, if interpretive
formalism is inferior to strong purposivism or dynamic statutory interpretation, the case for deference is far stronger. Those methods explicitly, and to a greater degree, call for interpreters to consider policy
consequences and evolving public values alongside, and sometimes
above, formalist tools. The more those values infuse legal interpretation, the stronger the bite of arguments for deference based on political
accountability and technical expertise. 271 It is possible to construct an
argument for judicial supremacy on nonformalist interpretive premises
- and many nonformalists do in the constitutional context - but it
would be different than the one presented here. 272 Nevertheless, it is
not surprising that the sharpest critics of judicial deference - Justices
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh - and the Justice with the most
aggressive Step One - the late Justice Scalia- are interpretive formalists.
Adjudicating these deeper questions of interpretive method and legal
determinacy is a matter for a separate paper - or, indeed, research

canons of statutory interpretation); Radin, supra note 245, at 878 (describing the policy choices
inherent in purposive interpretation).
2 7° Cf Radin, supra note 245, at 866 ("Words are certainly not crystals, as Mr. Justice Holmes has
wisely and properly warned us, but they are after all not portmanteaus. We can not quite put
anything we like into them.").
271 See Pojanowski, supra note 246, at 199.
2 7 2 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COL UM. L. REV. 452, 500-01 (1989) (challenging Chevron deference while rejecting
the notion that "the shaping of public policy is so foreign to the judiciary's proper task that courts
must avoid responsibility for resolving policy questions whenever possible," id. at 500); cf Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 377, 382 (1986)
(arguing that judicial review should be more searching than strong-form Chevron, while nevertheless concluding that deference is sometimes merited).
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agenda - and given the influence of legal realism, the burden of persuasion may fall on the neoclassical administrative lawyer. That said,
it is not clear that the neoclassicist must demonstrate that legal realism
is entirely wrong about formalism. Neoclassicism may survive even under a regime of "tame" legal realism in which courts can resolve most,
but not all, legal questions without appealing to first-order policy judgments. 273 Even if the law underdetermines a small fraction of the litigated cases posing legal questions, it does not follow that we should
structure the entire system of judicial review based on those exceptional
cases. A comparatively blunt rule of nondeference might overinclude
cases where a realist might prefer deference. One still has to balance
that against the errors and systematic distortions of a broader deference
regime, including: the complexities and satellite litigation about whether
to apply the framework and whether a statute is sufficiently clear; the
risk of judicial punting or inconsistency in the search for clarity; and the
effect of encouraging agencies to pursue what the law arguably allows
rather than identifying what the law truly requires.
But even if neoclassical administrative law has a whiff of pre-realist
naivete about it, it is not alone. Mainstream administrative law doctrine
is sensible only with a belief in the autonomy and determinacy of law.
At times, the leap of faith required in mainstream contexts is even more
daunting than the one neoclassical formalism presents. For example,
ordinary doctrinal science finds it coherent to ask whether an agency
pronouncement is a valid interpretive rule or illegitimate legislative rule
in the guise of interpreting a regulation. 274 Doing so requires a court to
distinguish between (a) mere interpretation of a norm and (b) policymaking in the norm's linguistic gaps. Notwithstanding academic encouragement to abandon the hunt for that jurisprudential snipe, 275 the
courts press on, 276 albeit with some Chevron-induced embarrassment. 277

273 Cf Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, gr TEX. L. REV. 749, 750 (2013) (describing
the "taming" of legal realism through such an argument).
274 See PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 205 r, 2055-56
(2019) (distinguishing between interpretive and legislative rules and remanding for a determination
of "the legal nature," id. at 2055, of the order under review).
275 See Manning, supra note 152, at 924 ("In view of the intellectual developments associated
with [Chevron], the present framework for distinguishing interpretative from legislative rules reduces to an unmanageable question of degree.").
276 See, e.g., Syncor Int'! Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d go, 93-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (seeking to distinguish legislative rules, interpretive rules, and policy statements); Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 170
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an interpretive rule must "be derived from the regulation by a process
reasonably described as interpretation" in a fashion that is closer to "the narrow sense [of] the ascertainment of meaning" than to policymaking choices); Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health
Admin., 995 F.2d rro6, rrr2 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (offering a test to distinguish interpretive and legislative rules).
277 See, e.g., Shala/a, 127 F.3d at 94; Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at IIIO.
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The structure of Chevron itself rests on pre-legal realist assumptions
that pragmatists and supremacists ostensibly reject. To stipulate that a
question can be clear or not presupposes a stable measure with which
to judge clarity. If that baseline is entirely or primarily policy-laden, it's
not clear what Step One is for; if it's policy all the way down, let the
politically accountable experts at the agency handle it. If courts can
register clarity - declare the law - for Step One purposes without
appealing to policy, however, it's not clear why the choice between two
plausible readings along that same metric reduces to a policy choice, as
opposed to legal judgment. 278 Because Chevron assumes Step One is
not policy-laden, the doctrine's structure presupposes greater legal determinacy than it or its practitioners admit. On this ground, deference
on legal questions should be "a doctrine of desperation" 279 reserved for
when interpretive arguments are nearly in equipoise or simply do not
provide enough material to work with, such as when statutes command
agencies to operate "in the public interest." In the former context, informal consideration of the agency's view as epistemic authority might be
warranted, 280 whereas the latter is truly an arbitrary and capricious
question mischaracterized as a legal one.
The pragmatists' more general embrace of administrative common
law also implies a stronger belief in law's autonomy and determinacy
than their Chevron-inflected legal realism lets on. As I have written
elsewhere, it is illuminating to compare the pragmatists' stance to that
of classical English common lawyers. 281 "[S]ensitive to the current texture of the law," those common lawyers "would extend, develop, and
even modify its principles to accommodate developments in society and
its norms. They would do so through a traditionalist, artificial method
of reason that would maintain coherence in legal doctrine and ensure
doctrine was roughly congruent with the society's shared sense of reasonableness. "282 Now, judges may not feel equipped for such work in
areas of complex regulatory policy as they would in torts or contracts,
so it is telling that much contemporary administrative common law
concerns not substance, but lawyerly, second-order questions about

278 Cf Breyer, supra note 272, at 379 ("It is difficult, after having examined a legal question in
depth with the object of deciding it correctly, to believe both that the agency's interpretation is
legally wrong, and that its interpretation is reasonable.").
279 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
28
Cf Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
281 See Pojanowski, supra note 20.
282 Id. For a discussion of classical common law understandings of "artificial reason," see Gerald
J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH
L.J. I, I - I I (2003).

°
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procedure and comparative institutional competence. 283 Pragmatists
therefore "argue about Chevron's domain, what is required for a reasoned agency explanation, and when agencies must engage in rulemaking."284 And, like common lawyers, pragmatists "do so with little attention to the text of the [APA] itself." 285
Following in the steps of the classical common lawyer, the pragmatist
keeps "faith in the artificial reason of the law," which aspires to help its
practitioners develop law with only indirect engagement with challenging substantive disputes. 286 Yet it remains a tall task. Consider the
pragmatist's inquiry on whether Chevron applies to a particular question. After Mead, the question of whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency is a complex reconstruction of "what a hypothetically 'reasonable' legislator would have wanted" in light of the
statute's structure and purpose, the nature of the question, and assessments of comparative institutional competence. 287 Even before Mead
and its progeny, critics recognized that such an inquiry would pose "a
formidable, if not an impossible, task." 288 The complexity and unpredictability of Chevron "Step Zero" 289 doctrine in the wake of Mead confirms this worry. Deciding whether "source" refers to a single smokestack or an entire facility seems simple by comparison.
Faith in the autonomy and determinacy of metalaw also surrounds
judicial calibration of agency procedure. The administrative common
lawyer who seeks to supplement the APA's provisions must strike the
right balance between procedural rigor and policy flexibility while translating constitutional values into the administrative setting. Again, in
comparison to the neoclassicist, who simply insists that courts can identify the most plausible interpretation of a statute or regulation, the pragmatist is taking a path that implies a more demanding faith in law. 290
Without such faith, the more responsible course would be to develop
administrative common law in the direction of Vermeule's administrative supremacy, where, for good lawyerly reasons, law retreats out of a
recognition of its own limits. 291

283 Cf William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, ro7 HARV.
L. REV. 2031, 2044 (1994) ("In a government of dispersed power and diverse views about substantive issues, frequently 'the substance of decision cannot be planned in advance in the form of rules
and standards,' but 'the procedure of decision commonly can be."') (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 173 (1958)).
284 Pojanowski, supra note 20.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Breyer, supra note 272, at 370.
288 Farina, supra note 272, at 469.
289 Sunstein, supra note 34, at 188, 190-91 (identifying as "Step Zero" the threshold question of
whether Chevron deference applies).
290 See Pojanowski, supra note 20.
291 See VERMEULE, supra note 6, at 3r.
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From this perspective, neoclassicism resembles a reformed or refined
version of administrative pragmatism. Both the neoclassicist and the
pragmatist believe there are statutory questions where the law runs out,
hence the neoclassicist's distinction between legal questions (no or little
deference) and arbitrary and capricious questions (rationality review).
Compared to the pragmatist, however, the neoclassicist believes that interpretive tools can stretch much further before reaching the domain of
policy: adjudicating disagreements over "lawyer's questions" (text, structure, canons, and so forth) is not policy-laden in the same way as deciding whether a regulation is "in the public interest." On the other hand,
the pragmatist has greater faith in the courts' capacity to develop administrative common law, while neoclassicists are more inclined to rely
on the APA and other review statutes, which they (unsurprisingly) believe are more determinate than the pragmatist does. Either way, "the
lawyer's faith endures, even amid the bewildering complexities of regulatory state." 292
B. The Priority of Original, Positive Law

Those convinced by the neoclassical commitment to law's autonomy
may remain dissatisfied or uncertain about its prioritization of original,
positive law like the APA and other procedural statutes over judge-made
doctrines. The concern here is that privileging the positive law upsets
the delicate balance courts have struck in adapting administrative law
to a landscape that the APA's framers did not imagine.
For example, an administrative pragmatist will note that neoclassicism might dial back judicial review of policymaking choices and erase
a number of agency procedural requirements. These changes could be
substantial. 293 The APA did not envision the explosion of informal rulemaking, though this is in part a product of the Court's drive-by dispatching of formal rulemaking. 294 The APA might require some minimal kind of explanation, but a pure neoclassical approach will likely not
require heightened rulemaking procedures or the intense instantiations
of hard look review. 295 Similarly, although black letter law gives mixed
signals about the scrutiny with which courts should review agency

29 2

Pojanowski, supra note 20.
See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring
agencies to satisfy numerous judicially imposed requirements during the notice and comment process).
294 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 4ro U.S. 224, 238 (1973) (concluding that the phrase
"after hearing" in the Interstate Commerce Act did not trigger formal rulemaking procedures).
295 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990) (grounding the reasoned explanation requirement in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); Portland Cement, 486 F.2d at 392-95 (imposing substantial duties on agencies regarding notice of proposed rulemaking and explanation of
rulemaking decisions).
293
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policymaking decisions, the arbitrary and capricious test requires more
than the rationality review courts afford ordinary regulatory legislation. 296
It is easy to understand why administrative common law has evolved
toward hard look review and bulked-up informal rulemaking. Agencies
are at best indirectly accountable to voters, can change policy more easily than legislatures, and might do their jobs better with procedures
more elaborate than the APA's bare bones suggest. At a deeper level,
whether phrased in terms of ensuring traditional Anglo-American ideals
about the rule of law take root in the administrative state 297 or avoiding
the creation of a Rechtsstaat, 298 there's a concern about ensuring the
rule of law extends to the operations of all officials, especially administrative officials exercising delegated state power. 299
There are, of course, powerful counterarguments that judicial additions to the APA cause more harm than good. 300 But this is not simply
about first-order questions on the wisdom of procedural additions to
informal rulemaking 301 or a more rigorous approach to arbitrary and
capricious review. 302 The neoclassicist's commitment to legislative supremacy need not preclude administrative common law a fortiori, but it
does require courts stay their hands when Congress has enacted positive
law on a question. It is possible that the APA supports something like
hard look review; Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp. 303 may
suggest as much in its ratification of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe. 304 The neoclassicist, however, would contend that the inquiry should begin by seeking the best reading of the APA or the
agency's governing statute, not asking whether common law developed
to optimize the administrative policymaking process can be reconciled
with a colorable reading of such legislation.

2 9 6 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, ro7 COL UM. L. REV.
r 749, r 76 r-63, r 76 r n. 75 (2007) (outlining the increased rigor of judicial review of administrative
policymaking over the last 50 years).
297 Cf LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23, at 207-2 r (explaining how administrative law doctrine
can comport with broader notions of fairness and legitimacy).
298 On Ernst Freund's unsuccessful bid to introduce the continental notion of the Rechtsstaat to
American administrative law, see ERNST, supra note 74, at 9-27.
2 99 Cf Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, r 15 MICH. L. REV.
1239, 1250-56 (2017) (discussing the categories of legal norms within administrative agencies).
300 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note ror (manuscript at 78) ("Many well-intentioned efforts to promote
good governance [through heightened procedures] can - and do - drain agencies of their legitimacy, impair their responsiveness to the public, and expose them to capture."); Kovacs, supra note
19, at 545-66 (discussing the unintended negative consequences of administrative common law in
this domain).
301 See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-95 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
302 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46-57 (1983);
Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-53 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
303 496 U.S. 633 (1990).
304 401 U.S. 402 (1971); see also Pension Benefit, 496 U.S. at 654-55.
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Thus, even if an originalist reading of the APA leads to less scrutiny
of agency policymaking judgments, and therefore bad consequences, the
neoclassicist would bite the bullet. The justifications for APA originalism track general defenses of originalism in other constitutional and
statutory contexts, 305 and those arguments are particularly strong here.
As noted, much contemporary administrative common law is best understood as judicial attempts to instantiate the principles inherent in
Professor Lon Fuller's internal morality of law. 306 As Professors Cass
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule have argued, however, there is a threshold question about where and when those rule-of-law principles should
supervene upon ordinary administrative law. 307 Along with that issue
come questions of institutional competence to determine the scope of the
morality of administrative law's domain. 308 These questions are particularly challenging because, as Fuller acknowledges, the internal morality of law is scalar and can never be perfectly realized along all its dimensions. 309 Rather, the goal is to strike a workable compromise among
competing values and ensure the legal system's inevitably imperfect attempts to achieve those aspirations do not fail completely. 310
The systemic complexity of implementing the internal morality of
law recalls another Fullerian trope, namely "polycentric" problems and
the limits of adjudicative forms of ordering in resolving those challenges. 311 Although a thoroughgoing common law system of administrative procedure (like a common law constitution) is possible, Fullerian
thinking points to the limits of making adjudication the primary source
of legal ordering here. 312 Against the administrative supremacist, who
might argue that managerial direction would be the best form for operationalizing the internal morality of law in the administrative state, the
neoclassical administrative lawyer can contend that systemic, durable,
legislated norms are both (a) more promising than judicial supervision
through case-by-case adjudication and (b) more legitimate than

See Bernick, supra note 230, at 834-35.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 5 7, passim.
307 Id. at 1967-71.
308 Id. at 1975-77.
3 o9 See id. at 1968 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969)).
310 See id. at 1969.
311 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404 (1978).
312 See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285,
1330 (2014) (arguing that when statutes balance "a host of incommensurate values ... courts have
no constitutional authority to revise that judgment and no epistemic basis for thinking they can
make a better one"); Kovacs, supra note 19, at 545-4 7 ("Courts are not well positioned to adjust the
benefits and burdens of the regulatory state." Id. at 545.).
305
306
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managerial direction by the administrative entity whose operations we
ideally would like to see harmonized with the rule of law. 313
The APA, while imperfect and by no means gapless, offers such direction. People may reasonably differ on whether its particular provisions strike the optimal balance, but as with constitutions, creating a
durable system of fair cooperation and coordination is not a matter of
scientific precision. If the code is good enough, the moral benefits of
fixed, enduring positive law recommend adhering to the original law
struck by the statute's framers. Thus, the neoclassicist's commitment
to original, positive law can be sympathetic to the pragmatist's desire to
bring administrative governance into harmony with the internal morality of law. It simply differs with pragmatism as to means. 314 When
Congress has legislated a systematic, durable framework for administrative governance under the rule of law, there should be a strong presumption in favor of fidelity to the proffered solution to that polycentric problem.
These considerations also shed light on the transition costs that will
accompany any return to a less procedurally demanding APA regime.
One can imagine the shock if agencies were allowed to dispense with the
paper hearing and give more minimalist explanations for their decisions
in informal rulemaking. (Or, on the converse, if agencies had a harder
time avoiding formal rulemaking.) As with any revisionary argument,
courts need to take transition costs into account when deciding whether
and how fast to return to what it understands as the best reading of the
law. Further complicating the matter is the sense that the APA's original, bare-bones requirements, which emphasize adjudication and ignore
complex rulemaking, are simply inadequate. Do we turn to the original
when the (purportedly illegitimate) common law strikes a better balance?
As a matter of first principles, the neoclassical commitment to legislative supremacy points to "yes" and blunts the normative argument
against the old regime with three interlocking observations. First, as
noted above, designing procedural regimes is complex and polycentric.
Judges should not be overconfident that new common law will strike
the proper balance between competing commitments, especially because

313 Cf Stack, supra note 23, at 3ro ("[D]oes inviting courts to police [an] agency's compliance
with rule-of-law values provide too great a practical temptation for them to reassert their roles as
deciders?").
314 For cognate arguments in the constitutional and human rights context, see generally
GREGOIRE WEBBER ET AL., LEGISLATED RIGHTS (2018); GREGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE
NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION (2009); Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 169. Canadian scholar
Matthew Lewans, who has offered an elegant argument that judicial review should ensure that the
internal morality of law thrives in administrative governance, see LEWANS, ALJD, supra note 23,
at 184-223, does not confront the possibility that supreme legislation can or should strike that balance. Although a few individual provinces have codes of administrative procedure, see, e.g.,
Province of Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c S.22 (Can.), there is no national
equivalent of the APA in Canada.
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that balance is deeply normative and warrants legislative input. It is
strange that a polity that manages its civil procedure, criminal procedure, appellate procedure, and rules of evidence through legislatively
approved codes should leave the procedures governing the lion's share
of its governance to pre-modern common law procedure.
Second, and relatedly, in the event that a return to stripped-down
procedures is a shock to the polity, it is not inconceivable that Congress
could intervene and add to the rules agencies must follow or heighten
the scrutiny of administrative policymaking. In fact, administrative
common law might be a source of legislative passivity in the face of a
changing statutory and regulatory landscape. 315 A Congress speaking
to a neoclassical judiciary could have more confidence that its legislative
efforts would be worthwhile. 316 As a corollary, neoclassical administrative lawyers should commit themselves to building a structure and
process for the ongoing supervision and revision of the rules of administrative procedure, much like is the case with the other federal rules.
Third, agencies do not always want to act in a rash, arbitrary, or
Delphic fashion. They also want to gather information to make good
policy choices, communicate with regulated parties and the public, and
organize their actions in an orderly fashion. By doing so, they can develop internal legal norms and sensibilities that the originalist approach
to the APA does not displace. In fact, while the story and its implications are complicated, it may be that post-APA judicial doctrines undermine this rule-of-law sensibility within the agencies. 317
C. Constitutional Modesty

Although pragmatists and supremacists may charge that neoclassicism's approach to legal interpretation is radical and old-timey, the administrative skeptic may charge that it is milquetoast and too newfangled. It is fine to believe that courts can identify the best meaning of
statutes and be originalist about the APA, the skeptic argues, but applying that legal craft to the original Constitution also entails rational basis
review of policymaking that abandons judicial duty and enables unconstitutional delegations. 318 Neoclassical administrative law is in the apparently awkward position of being formalist, originalist, and reformist
in statutory interpretation while remaining passive and pragmatic in

315 See Kovacs, supra note 19, at 554 ("[T]he courts' willingness to make law has enabled
Congress's inaction.").
316 See id. ("Instead of making Congress's decisions for Congress, the courts should make decisions that inspire Congress to deliberate.").
31 7 See Metzger & Stack, supra note 299, at 1288.
318 Similar concerns drive criticism of deference to agency factfinding. See Bernick, supra note
r 20, at 30 ("I conclude that judicial deference to agency fact-finding is unconstitutional in cases
involving deprivations of what I refer to as core private rights to life, liberty, and property.").
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constitutional interpretation. There are a number of answers that could
justify, or at least render plausible, this apparently paradoxical approach.
One plausible response would embrace divergence between statutory
and constitutional interpretation. Professor Kevin Stack has argued, for
example, that justifications for originalist textualism in statutory interpretation do not support a similar approach to constitutional interpretation. 319 He contends that neither (a) the majoritarian or rights-based
conceptions of democracy nor (b) the democratic deliberation-forcing
justifications for originalist textualism apply in constitutional interpretation as they do in the statutory context. 320 As a matter of theory, living
constitutionalism can coexist with statutory formalism.
The differences between the positive law of regulatory legislation
and the Constitution could also provide practical justifications for neoclassicism's divergent attitudes toward statutory and constitutional interpretation. Originalist, formalist legal craft may be more amenable to
judicial application in the statutory context than in the constitutional
domain. The particularities of regulatory legislation, including organic
statutes and the APA, may be more determinate, or are at least more
susceptible to lawyers' arguments, than are decisions over whether a
delegation to an agency is simply "too big" or "too important" and therefore unconstitutional. In this respect, the neoclassical administrative
lawyer's distinction between legal interpretation (active) and arbitrary
and capricious review (passive) recapitulates at the level of constitutional review. From the perspective of judicial capacity and role, the
nondelegation doctrine is the constitutional equivalent of a legislative
command that an agency must regulate "within the public interest."
This perspective also makes sense of how a rigorous textualist like
Justice Scalia could silently narrow Chevron via a strong Step One but
would not rigorously enforce the nondelegation doctrine in cases like
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns. 321
This defense of divergence is plausible but may not be satisfactory
on neoclassical terms. The practical case is contingent: the defense
erodes if, say, the APA is no less opaque than the Constitution, or if the
original law of the Constitution is clear and emphatic in its condemnation of most delegations of authority to administrative agencies. At a
theoretical level there is tension between the classical, conceptual defense of interpretive formalism - which is sympathetic to the notion
that there is something that legal interpretation "just is" - and the

31 9 Kevin M. Stack, The Divergence of Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, 75 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2004) (arguing that democratic values and the rule of law do not "require interpretive

convergence, and further that these foundations in fact suggest that constitutional and statutory
interpretation diverge," id. at 4).
320 Id. at 5.
321 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
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pragmatic justification for divergent interpretation in the constitutional
and statutory domains. 322 Though the above explanations may satisfy
many of neoclassicism's critics, there are further justifications at hand.
Another response would deny any conflict between originalist constitutional interpretation and the administrative state we have.
Originalism, the argument goes, does not require rigorous enforcement
of the nondelegation doctrine, permits judicial deference on questions of
policy, and gives Congress wide latitude to calibrate agency procedure
and structure. Professor John Manning argues, for example, that the
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress wide latitude in structuring
the administrative state in the absence of clear constitutional text to the
contrary. 323 Perhaps one could mount a similar originalist defense of
neoclassicism through Professor Jack Balkin's framework originalism 324
by pointing to substantial delegations in the Founding era 325 or by recalling recent evidence that the nondelegation doctrine was nowhere
near as potent as originalist critics suppose. 326 Without endorsing any
item in this litany of defenses, I nevertheless note that originalist investigation could defuse some of the squibs against the administrative state.
A related justification for constitutional modesty here would not rest
on compatibility between the original Constitution and current practice,
but rather the original understanding of the judicial role. Here one
could draw on Professor Steven Calabresi's originalist critique of libertarian originalist theories that require active judicial engagement. 327
Even if the original understanding of the Constitution contradicts the
administrative state we have, it also rejects rigorous judicial enforcement of originalist norms over and above the decisions of the political
branches. The Constitution's text, structure, and history militate

322 See Cass R. Sunstein, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT.
193 (2015).
323 John F. Manning, The Supreme Court, 20I3 Term - Foreword: The Means of Constitutional
Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 53 (2014) ("[T]he text of the Necessary and Proper Clause, read against
the constitutional structure as a whole, requires deference to Congress's reasonable judgments
about how to implement not only its own powers, but also those of the coordinate branches.").
324 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
32 5 JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (2012).
326 See Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2017).
32 7 See Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A
Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, ro3 MICH. L. REV. ro81, ro83 (2005) [hereinafter Calabresi,
Reply to Barnett] (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)). Calabresi has since revised his position to call for
greater judicial enforcement of the Constitution. See Steven G. Calabresi, Originalism and James
Bradley Thayer, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1419, 142 7-42 (2019) (providing an originalist case for stronger
judicial review).
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against a powerful role for the Court. 328 Conferring such revisory power
to the institution creates a sweeping countermajoritarian power for
which the courts are not well suited, and which the Framers never contemplated. 329 Formalist and vigorous judicial review of the ordinary
positive law Congress and agencies laid down - and can more readily
revise - does not raise similar problems.
A neoclassicist can further justify her constitutional modesty by
noting that theories of constitutional interpretation do not always track
theories of constitutional adjudication. 330 Even originalists recognize
that the best interpretation of a clause of the Constitution does not necessarily entail that such an interpretation govern judicial review. 331 A
fleshed-out theory of adjudication will include a theory of stare decisis
and related prudential considerations that caution against seamlessly
and immediately translating the original law of the Constitution into the
legal content of a particular decision. Drawing on Solum's recent discussion of originalism and precedent, for example, we can identify two
reasons for constitutional passivity. 332
First, to the extent that one is an originalist for rule-of-law reasons,
disrupting the entire administrative law edifice runs headlong into those
underlying justifications. 333 Blowing up the administrative state would
hardly promote the "predictability, certainty, stability," or "uniformity"334 that inspire some originalists to adhere to the original
Constitution. For that reason, transitions back toward the original
Constitution need to be incremental, and the "length of the transition
period would depend on the extensiveness of the changes required by
originalism and judgments about the rapidity with which they could be

328 See Calabresi, Reply to Barnett, supra note 32 7, at 1092 ("There is simply no way to read the
bare-bones language of Article III ... and conclude that the Framers meant the Court to be a
powerful institution .... Nor does the bare text of the Constitution suggest that the federal courts
have a distinct role as the defenders and protectors of the federal Constitution.").
329 See id. at ro94 (discussing countermajoritarian difficulty); id. at ro96-97 (noting the institutional constraints of the judiciary). Although Calabresi raises these worries in the context of policyladen decisions about the reasonableness of substantive state incursions on liberty, see id. at ro8283, inquiries about whether an agency policy judgment is sound or a congressional delegation is too
large are similar.
330 On the distinction between theories of interpretation and full-fledged theories of adjudication,
see Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 169, at 149.
331 See id. at 155. The fact that a constitutional norm may be underenforced in adjudication
does not impugn its validity. To the contrary, Congress and the executive branch could be better
positioned to give it practical force. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, gr HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1226-28 (1978).
332 See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Theory and Precedent: A Public Meaning Approach, 33
CONST. COMMENT. 451 (2018) (reviewing RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A
THEORY OF PRECEDENT (2017)).
333 See id. at 461-62.
334 Id. at 460.
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effected without damage to the rule of law." 335 Given the breadth
and depth of the administrative state's departure from the original
Constitution, it is hardly unreasonable to urge caution on judicial reconstruction of the constitutional order.
Second, to the extent one is an originalist for reasons of popular sovereignty, constitutional modesty has much to offer - and does so in a
way that can promote the values underlying the original constitutional
order. 336 The neoclassicist's hesitance about becoming a full-blown administrative skeptic could flow from a recognition that our country's
political morality has shifted such that a judicially imposed return to the
original settlement is presently impossible. 337 The judiciary lacks the
institutional capital and perhaps even the capacity to turn the aircraft
carrier around on a dime. This is not simply a matter of counting to
five votes on the Court; it is also a question of preserving the judiciary's
legitimacy in the eyes of a public that would view major restructuring
of the constitutional regime as incomprehensible today.
Of course, it is fair to ask why the prudential and precedential arguments discouraging the neoclassical administrative lawyer from a constitutional "big bang" do not also apply to the statutory context. Much
of the modern administrative state rests on doctrinal presumptions
about procedure and judicial review that an originalist approach to the
APA would disturb. Thus, a neoclassicist could avoid a shock in ordinary administrative law by adopting a this-far-and-no-further approach, respecting stare decisis on administrative common law but not
creating further departures from positive administrative law. Alternatively, a neoclassical court could chip away at administrative common
law to ease the transition. This approach may be advisable and could
be required - stare decisis is part of the law as well. 338
That said, there are good reasons for greater caution at the constitutional level. This may sound odd, given the standard argument that
stare decisis has a weaker pull in the constitutional setting than with
respect to statutes, 339 but further reflection supports inverting the conventional wisdom. So much of the judicial common law governing judicial

Id. at 462.
See id. at 462-63.
33 7 See FROHNEN & CAREY, supra note 92, at 219; cf Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die
and the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 708 (1997) (praising the Supreme Court
335
336

decision to refrain from intervening on "questions of morality and social policy").
338 See Bernick, supra note 230, at 847 (discussing the role of precedent in implementing APA
originalism).
33 9 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (stating that stare decisis is more flexible "in
constitutional cases, because in such cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible"' (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (observing that stare decisis
has "special force" in the statutory context).
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review and administrative procedure is so loosely tethered to the text of
the relevant statutes that it is hard to say statutory stare decisis comes
into play at all. 340 There are also powerful arguments against giving interpretive methodologies like Chevron deference stare decisis effect. 341
Beyond those considerations, the effects of departing from stare decisis in the statutory context here are less dramatic than an originalist
rejection of large portions of the administrative state. If the original
APA requires courts to trim back an agency's obligation to provide fulsome notices and responses to comments in rulemaking, that would be
a sharp change from current practice. It would, however, be less destabilizing than a robust revival of the nondelegation doctrine, restriction
of the commerce power, or requirement that large swaths of administrative adjudication flow through Article III courts. Moreover, whether
trimming back rulemaking procedure is good 342 or bad, 343 Congress has
the ability to correct course there in a way it cannot if the Supreme
Court ruled familiar features of the administrative state unconstitutional. There's congressional gridlock, and then there's constitutional
amendments - or, more realistically, efforts to control the White House
and Senate so as to appoint non-originalist Supreme Court Justices, thus
adding administrative law as yet another battlefield in the confirmation
wars consuming our political energy. In any event, congressional action
on administrative procedure here would be welcome for, as noted above,
the complexity, normative tradeoffs, and need for systematicity involved
in developing procedural systems suggests the superiority of legislation
over common law in setting the agenda in this domain. 344

* * *
Beyond ordinary stare decisis, the neoclassicist's constitutional
modesty may simply reflect a deeper sense that, at least for now, basic
features of our constitutional order are simply incapable of judicial
340 See Metzger, supra note 59, at 1311 ("Notably, however, the statutory tether for administrative
common law is often loose and quite attenuated from doctrinal substance."). But cf Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258, 283-84 (1972) (refusing to overturn Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption in
the face of congressional acquiescence).
341 See Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare
Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, u28-29 (2019); see also Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against
Methodological Stare Decisis, ro2 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1595 (2014); Metzger, supra note 59, at 1311.
342 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV.
59, 60-62 (1995) (describing the current state of bulked-up rulemaking as a problem in need of solving).
343 See Daniel Farber, Kavanaugh's Threat to Government and Transparency and Accountability,
CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM: CPRBLOG Guly 19, 2018), http://progressivereform.
org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=ooA51DF0-D300-CAC0-0144F641CD1B 18F8 [https://perma.cc/TR7 4WGXD] (noting then-Judge Kavanaugh's APA originalist concurrence in American Radio Relay
League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008), would "give agencies much more ability to hide
the ball").
344 See supra section III.B, pp. 908-12.
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revision. As defenders and critics of the administrative state will agree,
the development and rise of the Fourth Branch was a three-branch enterprise. Even if the original constitutional norms have not been erased
by intervening practice, 345 any durable return to that original law will
also have to be a three-branch project, and one that depends on a change
in the political culture. One way for the judiciary to play a principled
and constructive role in that cultural return is to both insist on its supremacy on questions of ordinary law and recognize the limits of its
capacity to resolve questions of policy. With the constitutional nettle
too sharp to grasp today, the courts can nevertheless demonstrate their
proper, limited role in a system of separated powers on questions of statutory interpretation and regulatory policy. 346
Furthermore, by abstaining from the administrative common law
that seeks to smooth the operation of the administrative state, the courts
would make the consequences of other branches' choices clearer. When
Congress writes blank legislative checks to agencies, it can no longer
count on the judiciary to serve as moderating trustees. In that respect,
a neoclassicist court could heighten the contradictions of our constitutional disorder while pointedly and publicly limiting itself to its original,
proper role in ordinary judicial review. Such an approach may offer a
better object lesson in constitutional restoration than trying to anathematize the administrative state one 5-4 vote at a time - a bid for a
constitutional "big bang" 347 that is more likely to blow up in the face of
its initiators than restore the constitutional order.
Yet even if neoclassical administrative law is not likely to bring us
closer to the original order and even if - or especially if - one does not
want to sign up for such a reform project, this approach has an appeal
that draws deeply on our legal traditions. It contends that courts, not
political officials, should have the last word on the meaning of law, that
courts and officials should do their best to follow the procedures the
legislature has laid down, and that political officials, not courts, should
make hard policy choices when there is no law to apply. It adapts the
basic elements of Diceyan constitutionalism to the modern administrative state, respecting both the rule of law and political responsibility for
lawmaking without collapsing the two into each other. For a legal formalist, neoclassical administrative law is the most practicable realization of traditional legal arrangements to the presently unmovable demands of modern governance.

See Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 169, at 152-53.
Cf Sager, supra note 331, at 1263 ("The federal courts comprise a crucial bulwark against
evulsive depredations of constitutional values; but against scattered erosion they are relatively powerless.... We thus depend heavily upon other governmental actors for the preservation of the principles embodied in these constitutional provisions.").
347 Cf Solum, supra note 332, at 462.
345
346
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CONCLUSION

Classical legal thought understood public law as reducing to two
principles associated with two institutions: the rule of law upheld by
ordinary courts and supreme legislation promulgated by politically accountable officials. Any vision of the administrative state more complex
than rote application of clear legislative norms was excluded by this
constitutional logic. Yet there the administrative state is. So much
argument in administrative law revolves around reconciling the contemporary regulatory state with this classical definition, separation, and assignment of political powers.
Two different approaches resolve the dilemma by largely dissolving
it. Resurgent skepticism of the administrative state seeks to solve the
problem by reintroducing a classical framework that deprives agencies
of law-interpreting and lawmaking power. The opposite, supremacist
tack grants agencies law-interpreting power on any question of interest
and recognizes wide, discretionary power to make law; there, both ordinary courts and traditional legislatures retreat from a scene where interpretation and lawmaking merge. A third, pragmatic approach accommodates the administrative state to traditional concepts of rule of law
and politically responsible government by giving agencies moderated
and modulated power to interpret and make law. Like the supremacist,
the pragmatist recognizes a fusion of interpretation and lawmaking
power in administrative governance, but at the same time seeks to ensure that courts play a supervisory role in securing the rule of law in
that new domain.
Neoclassical administrative law rearranges the pieces of this puzzle
differently. At an ideal level, it has a greater faith in the separation of
law and policy than its pragmatist and supremacist rivals, and it insists
that ordinary courts be the ultimate arbiters of legal questions. Unlike
classical skepticism of administrative power, neoclassicism expands its
notion of politically responsive legislative supremacy to include administrative agencies. In doing so it confers on agencies similar respect it
would give to a legislature, provided that the authorizing legislature
does not require more scrutiny as a matter of law. We can see glimmers
of this approach in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, which is increasingly formalist and more skeptical of legal deference and judicial
common law in administrative procedure, and yet unwilling to dismantle the administrative state wholesale. Neoclassical administrative law
is the natural resting point for a legal formalist who accepts the necessity, or at least the ongoing existence, of the administrative state that
Congress has chosen to construct.

